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Abstract 
 
          In 1934, the National Tsinghua University established an institute of agriculture. It 
was expanded and strengthened during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Although it only 
existed for twelve years, this institute played a significant role in the history of science in 
modern China. Fifty-nine agricultural scientists worked at this institute. Four of them 
were selected as academicians of the Academia Sinica in 1948, and fourteen became 
academicians of the China’s Academy of Sciences after 1949. This essay will examine 
the history of the Institute of Agriculture in Tsinghua University and explore the reason 
for its success. I argue that the Tsinghua researchers’ dual-identity of being both Chinese 
people and scientists enabled this institute to survive and thrive in an extremely turbulent 
era. Motivated by the Chinese-scientist dual-identity, these scientists at Tsinghua IOA 
were able to be flexible and to relieve tensions between the Chinese and the foreign, 
between the central and local political forces, and between different local environments, 
and therefore contributed to the development of both their country and the scientific 
knowledge they worked on. 
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I.	Introduction	
        In this thesis, I will take agricultural scientists at Tsinghua University as a case study 
to explore a group of scientists who had received training in the United States and 
conducted scientific work in China during the 1930s and 1940s. These scientists 
articulated their goals in the terms of a “dual-identity” of being both “scientist” and 
“Chinese”. I would like to define the identity of “Chinese” as the love for China, the 
feeling of belonging to China, and the desire to serve China and its people. This 
definition is mainly based on cultural belief and feeling rather than politics, although 
political context played an important role in the history I am exploring. On the other 
hand, the identity of “scientist” implies the social and professional responsibility of 
scientists in a broader global sense. The Chinese scientists in this work faced issues 
similar to their American colleagues such as scientists’ struggle to maintain their 
intellectual autonomy and the appeal to social duty. However, because of critical 
differences in their historical context, the Chinese scientists reacted to these issues 
differently from the western scientists. They identified themselves in this dual way: as 
scientists and as deeply Chinese. The fact that these scientists were trained in the West, 
along with their American and British counterparts, highlights the tension between the 
global circulation of scientific knowledge and the need to apply it in particular local 
contexts. My argument is: motivated by the Chinese-scientist dual-identity, these 
agricultural scientists were able to adapt to the chaotic context of Republican China. They 
acquired the dual-identity through their distinctive experiences. By stressing their dual-
identity, these scientists were able to be flexible—to relieve tensions between the Chinese 
and the foreign, between the central and local political forces, and between different local 
environments. They not only survived and adapted to the chaos, but believed that they 
had improved both their country and the sciences they worked on. In addition, they were 
able to send their achievements back to the West, and thus contributed the transnational 
circulation of scientific knowledge. 
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        My study is situated primarily in the scholarly literature about Chinese scientists 
who pursued education and training in Western universities. Historians such as James 
Reardon-Anderson, Wang Zuoyue, and Sigrid Schmalzer have explored some themes 
related to my argument.1 For example, in his 2002 article “Saving China Through 
Science: The Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and the Civil Society in 
Republican China,” Wang studied a group of scientists who received college and 
graduate education in the United States in the 1910s and went back to China after their 
American education. According to Wang, these scientists were motivated by “scientific 
nationalism,” which Wang defined as “Chinese scientists’ desire to create a strong, 
unified, and prosperous Chinese nation.” Wang pointed out that the scientific nationalism 
is different from the nationalism of Japanese scientists and German scientists in that the 
Chinese scientists were emphasizing their country rather than science.2  
        Overall, I agree with Wang that Chinese scientists were enthusiastic to save their 
country with their scientific knowledge. Wang’s work focused on the development of 
scientific societies and institutions because very few of these institutions existed for 
scientists in China in the 1910s and early 1920s. Wang uses “professionalism” to describe 
how the first generation of American-trained Chinese scientists returned to a vacuum of 
scientific institutions and established a system based on the western model but 
maintained intimate and complex connections with successive political regimes in 
Republican China.3 My project supports some of Wang’s conclusions, but focuses on a 
later time period. During the 1930s and 1940s, American-trained Chinese scientists 
returned to better developed professional institutions than their predecessors, and 
therefore were able to be more concentrated on scientific research and education. They 
still had a strong desire to serve China; meanwhile, different from the first generation, 
                                                 
1 See Wang, Zuoyue, “Saving China through Science: the Science Society of China, Scientific 
Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China”, Osiris, Vol. 17, (2002), pp. 291-322; James 
Reardon-Anderson, The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 1840-1949, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, Part III and Part IV; and Sigrid Schmalzer, “Popular Science, 
A Useful and Productive Category after All,” Isis, Vol. 98, (2007), pp. 571-583, and “Knowledge 
in Transit across Yang / Tu Boundaries: The Transnational and the Popular in Mao-era Chinese 
Science,” HSS 2012 Annual Meeting at San Diego, California. 
2 Wang, p. 299. 
3 Wang, pp. 299-309. 
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these younger scientists had a strong desire to contribute to international science as well. 
The identity of being “Chinese” played significant roles in the lives of both the older and 
younger scientists in Republican China, although in different ways, as I have described. 
The importance of the identity as a contributor to international science became 
remarkable only for the younger generation, after the scientific institutions had been built 
up in China. 
        I prefer to use the “Chinese-scientist dual-identity” rather than “scientific 
nationalism” in my study for three reasons. Firstly, there is no satisfactory equivalent in 
Chinese language for the English term “nationalism.” “Nationalism” is usually translated 
into two Chinese terms: “爱国主义” or “民族主义”. The first translation, “爱国主义”, 
means simple “love for country” and does not necessarily involve ethnical or political 
implications. “民族主义”, the second translation, reflects ethnics and nation-state 
concepts, but is actually seldom used in Chinese even today. Scientists in my project 
were more likely to use the term “爱国” (love the country). The English phrase 
“scientific nationalism” is not enough to accurately express the ideas and feelings of 
these scientists. Secondly, for the time period I am working on, there was not a strong 
consistent national identity in China as there was in Japan. Although China used to be a 
“Central Empire”, the central government had gradually lost its power to local forces 
since the late Qing Dynasty. In Republican China (1911-1949), the so-called central 
government—first the Beiyang government in Beijing, then the Nationalist 
government—could effectively control only certain provinces, while warlords were 
controlling other parts of China. Chinese scientists in this project might prefer diverse 
political forces and did not have a strong feeling of loyalty to China as a “political” 
entity, but their love for China as a country and the desire to serve the Chinese people 
might even become stronger because of pressures from both inside and outside of the 
country. Thirdly, although part of the definition of “Chinese identity” coincides with 
Wang Zuoyue’s definition of “scientific nationalism,” the exact implication and 
realization of “the desire to serve China” was changing through the 1930s and 1940s, 
when the Chinese scientists were enthusiastically serving both China and their sciences. 
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Therefore, I would like to avoid the term “scientific nationalism” which involves too 
much political meaning; instead my thesis uses the “dual-identity” to characterize the 
motivations of Chinese scientists trained in the West from the late 1920s through the 
1940s.  
        Reardon-Anderson has analyzed difference between the first and second generations 
of Chinese scientists in Part III of his book The Study of Change: Chemistry in China, 
1840-1949. He explored works of the Chinese chemists and argued that during the 
“Nanking decade” (1927-1937) and wartime, political authority and scientific autonomy 
were able to reach a balance. Although there were always conflicts between the state’s 
demand for practical knowledge from the scientists and the scientists’ demand to conduct 
pure research, they were able to maintain a compromise to benefit each other. 4  
        Reardon-Anderson’s work is very valuable for studies of the history of agricultural 
sciences as well. However, although he included science in Yan’an (center of the areas 
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party) in his book, for Nationalist China (1928-
1949) Reardon-Anderson concentrated more on scientists near the state political center. A 
remarkable characteristic of republican China was its decentralized status, and this is 
reflected in my study. In regions formally controlled by the Nationalist government, 
social, economic, and political situations were highly diverse and unbalanced. Although it 
is undeniable that scientists near Nanjing (or Chongqing during the wartime) seem 
representative for the history of science in modern China, we should notice that scientists 
far away from the political center were very contributive for both China and international 
science as well, while the environments in which they were working were quite different. 
We should also notice that the undeveloped regions had demands for scientific 
knowledge as well. Therefore, my contribution is to introduce an institute—the Institute 
of Agriculture at Tsinghua University (Qinghua Daxue Nongye Yanjiusuo, I will use 
Tsinghua IOA for short)—that was far away from the political center during the 1930s 
and 1940s (Nanjing or Chongqing). This institute was first established in Peiping 
(Beijing), the former national capital and one of the cultural centers in Republican China. 
During the war, it was forced to move to Hunan and Yunan, some undeveloped 
                                                 
4 Reardon-Anderson, p. 255-257. 
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southwestern provinces. The development and reform of Tsinghua IOA is a valuable case 
study to explore my argument of how the Chinese-scientist dual-identity had motivated 
American-trained Chinese scientists to deal with diverse political forces and to adapt to 
continually changing social and natural environments.  
          In her recent works, Schmalzer has also focused on agricultural sciences in modern 
China and has investigated roles of the Chinese-foreign identity in the career of Chinese 
agricultural scientists.5 My project supplements the ideas of Schmalzer because, actually, 
for sciences in most post-colonial countries, the native-foreign relation is an important 
topic, but this is especially complex in post-colonial China. The semi-colonial situation 
determined that Republican China had to develop in ways different from western 
countries, while the huge territory and imbalanced natural and social diversity with the 
country itself made it distinctive from other post-colonial countries. Western science was 
something imported from foreign countries and was supposed to be universal. Its foreign 
origin along with its so-called universal spirit might cause controversy among post-
colonial people eager to emphasize the identity of their own country. However, 
Republican China was in a state of decentralization. The country itself was in fact 
separated and governed by different warlords and Chinese people had to live under 
different political forces. Few post-colonial countries have experienced such separation. 
The Chinese-scientist dual-identity helped Chinese scientists overcome this difficult 
situation. Motivated by the identity of being “Chinese” in a cultural sense, the scientists 
were able to conquer political barriers caused by warlordism. Motivated by the identity of 
being a “scientist”, they were also able to apply their knowledge to diverse natural 
regions and social fields. Schmalzer’s recent work on the Chinese-foreign identities of 
Chinese agricultural scientists mainly focused on the Maoist period—generally from 
1950s to 1970s—which was later than my focus. During the Maoist period, the authority 
of the central government and state power was greatly strengthened compared to the 
1930s and 1940s. Decentralization and internal diversity were not so critical as in the 
Republican era. However, as China has reopened and reformed since the 1980s, the issue 
of localism and internal imbalance has become important again. Therefore, some of the 
                                                 
5 Schmalzer, “Knowledge in Transit across Yang / Tu Boundaries”, 2012 HSS annual meeting. 
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conclusions in this article might be applied to the history of science in post-reform China 
as well.  
        In the following pages, I will first outline a general picture of the historical context 
of Republican China. Then I will examine the development of Tsinghua IOA and the 
lives and careers of the IOA scientists. My thesis on the roles of Chinese-scientist dual-
identity will be supported through answering questions such as: (1) how these scientists 
had pursued studies and careers in America and Republican China; (2) how they had not 
only survived but also thrived in times of extreme political chaos and at locations of 
diverse natural and social conditions; and (3) how they had contributed to global 
circulations of scientific knowledge. 
II.	The	Chinese‐Foreign	Tension	
A	General	Picture	of	Republican	China	and	Foreign	Influence	
        The influence of political context should never be neglected in studies of the history 
of science in modern China. I would like to use “decentralization” to characterize the 
political condition of China during the first half of the twentieth century. China had been 
considered as the “central empire” before the nineteenth century. However, the imperial 
Qing government had been defeated by modernized foreign countries and had not been 
able to control and strengthen China effectively since the late 19th century. After the loss 
in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, local military governors 
gradually gained dominance of their provinces from the central government, and they 
later became warlords in the republican era.  
        The 1911 Revolution ended the Qing Empire with the accession of a republican 
government. Yuan Shikai (袁世凯), the most powerful military leader, held the country 
for several years. During the decades after Yuan’s death in 1916, China fell into many 
parts governed by different warlords, which was usually called the “Warlord Era” (1916-
1928). (See Figure 1.) Although the Nationalist Party (KMT) government became the 
central government authority in 1928 and unified China in form, it was not capable of 
overcoming the warlords and establishing a strong national identity for all Chinese 
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people. (See Figure 2.) The KMT government had undertaken reforms—such as the New 
Life Movement and the Rural Revival Movement—to improve its political authority. 
However, policies made by the KMT government were largely ignored in regions 
controlled by other political forces (including the Communist Party, CCP). Even within 
the provinces directly under the KMT government’s influence, these reforms were highly 
restricted to the urban areas, while most rural areas remained untouched. Therefore, 
China after 1911 must be considered as quite decentralized,6 and my project revises 
previous work by examining the activities of scientists specifically in this context. 
        During the Second Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese 
occupied northern and eastern China. The Chinese government and hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese people had to retreat to the southwestern inland provinces, which 
were still extremely undeveloped at that time. (See Figure 3.) Although living and 
working conditions declined horribly for most Chinese people, the decentralized political 
situation got simplified during the war. After the Sino-Japanese War, only two strong 
political forces—the KMT and the CCP—remained to compete for political domination. 
The end of the war marks the end of my analysis.  
        Despite the political chaos, scientific institutions were established in China during 
these decades. These early institutions reflected the semi-colonial conditions in China at 
the turn of the century. In 1909, the Qing government compromised with the United 
States to set up the Boxer Scholarship to support Chinese students studying practical 
knowledge in American universities. These students became the first generation of 
American-trained Chinese scholars. They had contributed to the establishment and 
development of scientific research and education, publications, civil societies, and policy 
making. During the turbulent decades of early republican China, foreign activities such as 
missionary schools and the Boxer Scholarship critically helped 
                                                 
6 For the general situation of agriculture in Republican China, see Guo, Congjie, and Chen Lei, 
“Nanjing KMT Government’s Policies for Agricultural Popularization before the Sino-Japanese 
War”; also see Zhang Shijie and Guo Hairu, “Jiang Jieshi’s Ideology of Agricultural Economics”. 
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       Figure 1, 2, 3 are maps showing the importance of paying attention to the local 
conditions during the republican period in Chinese history. There was no strong 
central government in China at that time. Therefore “scientific nationalism” is not a 
proper phrase to describe this period because there was no clear political “nation”. 
Figure 3 also shows the movements of chief agricultural schools caused by the 
Japanese invasion in 1937 and 1938. 
 
Figure 1. This picture roughly illustrates the political situation in China in mid‐1924, 
when Beijing government was internationally considered as the legitimate Chinese 
government (but it only controlled the provinces around Beijing, not including Shanxi 
province). The blue area was controlled by KMT; the green areas represent different 
warlord groups. 
(The Chinese administrative districts in 1924 were slightly different from those 
between 1928 and 1949. Here I use the same base map for the convenience of 
comparing the political situations.) 
  9 
 
Figure 2. This picture shows political and military situation in China before the Central 
Plains War in 1930. The KMT unified China in form in 1928. Beijing was renamed as 
Peiping; it was no longer the national capital. Most remaining warlords claimed to 
submit to the KMT government based in Nanjing (therefore I changed them into light 
blue), but they actually kept independence in politics and military matters. The KMT 
government could effectively control provinces in East and Southeast China (dark‐
blue‐shadow area). Conflicts between the KMT and other warlords finally resulted in 
the Central Plains War. The red circles indicate main battlefields of this war. Because 
of battles in Shandong and Henan, the Nanjing KMT government completely lost its 
control over Peiping for several months, which results in a series of changes at 
Tsinghua. 
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Figure 3. The purple shadow in this picture shows areas occupied by the Japanese troops by 
1940. When the Sino‐Japanese War comprehensively started in July 1937, most academic 
institutes had to retreat to safer rear areas because of failures of the Chinese armies. For 
example, the National Central University moved to Chongqing along with the KMT 
government, the National Wuhan University moved to Leshan, and the National Sun Yat‐Sen 
University moved to Chengjiang. Three leading universities from North China—Tsinghua, PKU, 
and the Nankai University—moved to Changsha first, then to Kunming in early 1938, and 
continued researches and educations as the Southwest Associated University (Lianda for short) 
during the war. Most Chinese scholars and young students moved to the southwest rear along 
with their institutes. So did the KMT armies, officials, and some refugees from the Japanese‐
occupied areas (which means a lot of mouths to feed—a huge pressure for agricultural 
production!).  
       The old political pattern in China was significantly changed because of the war. Most 
warlords gradually lost their forces. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) got a 
chance to grow (marked as Yan’an in this map). It kept independent during the war and 
attracted some intellectuals from the Japanese‐occupied areas as well. For example, Zhou 
Jiachi from Tsinghua IOA studied at Yan’an for half a year in 1938. The KMT government was 
trying to eliminate the CCP all through the war, which disappointed many Chinese people 
(such as Tang Peisong) because they hoped the central government would concentrate on 
fighting against the Japanese rather than other Chinese. 
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the development of science in China as well. Their roles declined after the Anti-Christian 
Movement in the late 1920s, when most non-Chinese were forced to leave Chinese 
institutions.7  
        The KMT government (1927-1949) strengthened support as well as control of 
science.  Within regions effectively controlled by the KMT central government, the 
Ministry of Education reformed scientific education significantly. State and provincial 
funds were set up to support students to travel to America and European countries to 
study science, engineering, medicine, and agriculture. Universities receiving foreign 
funds were reformed into private (mainly the missionary) or national (Tsinghua) 
universities and were required to take the Ministry of Education’s direction. Scientific 
publication was supervised by the KMT government. Governmental institutes and 
departments such as the Central Agricultural Experimental Institute (中央农业实验所, 
Zhongyang Nongye Shi Yan Suo, also named as the National Agricultural Bureau; I will 
use CAEI for short) were established to organize and encourage scientific people to work 
on knowledge most useful for the country’s development. Scientific civil societies such 
as the Science Society of China worked together with the officials to facilitate and 
regulate activities of scientists. In addition, Academia Sinica, which also functioned as 
the ministry of science and technology, cooperated with relevant organizations and 
helped Chinese scientists to participate in more international scientific communication. 
As more and more scientists with western training background returned to China and 
joined these institutions, the Chinese became more active in global science.  
        Here I would like to borrow Reardon-Anderson’s way to categorize the Western-
trained Chinese scientists and refer to the scientists returning to China during the Warlord 
Era (before 1928) as the “first-generation” scientists, and those returning during the KMT 
era as the “second generation” or “younger generation.”8 Although both generations of 
Chinese scientists had a strong desire to serve the country, they behaved in significantly 
                                                 
7 See Zhang Kaiyuan and Arthur Waldron, Christian Universities and Chinese-Western Cultures, 
and Loren William Crabtree, Christian Colleges and the Chinese Revolution, 1840-1940: A Case 
Study in the Impact of the West. 
8 James Reardon-Anderson, pp. 177-185. 
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different ways because of the changing situations of scientific institutions in China. In the 
early twentieth century, there were very few scientific institutes in China. For the early 
generation of American-trained Chinese scientists, the identity of being scientists seemed 
less important. Their most critical task was to establish an institution for scientific 
research and education. However, during the decades after 1927, younger Chinese 
scientists had received better educations than their predecessors, had institutions in China 
to return home to, and were more committed to research and teaching as their 
responsibility. Those entering their scientific careers after the late 1920s were usually less 
interested in the broad political and cultural concerns—partly because they were educated 
in better-established scientific institutions, and partly because compared with their 
predecessors, they had to work harder to find a position to work in these institutions. 
There were more and more debates on the social responsibility and autonomy of 
scientists gradually during this period, just like in western countries where scientific 
institutions had grown mature. While for the early-generation scientists, their social 
responsibility—to serve China—meant to build up more scientific schools, societies, 
journals, or to participate in political activities beneficial for the development of science 
in China, while for the younger generation, probably the best way to serve China was to 
create good sciences.  
        Although scientific institutional establishments had achieved remarkable results, 
before the second Sino-Japanese war, most of the achievements were limited in the 
coastal regions—north, east, and south China, while the inland regions remained 
underdeveloped. During the war (1937-1945), most Chinese scientists had to leave their 
well-established homes and workplaces and retreat to the southwestern provinces: 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. They had to adapt their knowledge and 
practices to the local circumstances to survive. A general tendency was that the Chinese 
scientists had to apply their knowledge and skill to more practical and useful topics which 
might quickly improve agriculture and industry in the parts of China not occupied by 
Japanese forces. Pure research became something supplementary for most scientific 
workers, but scientists struggled to maintain their research programs nonetheless. 
Governmental authority took more control over activities of scientists. When facing 
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threats from foreign forces, scientists driven by the identity of being Chinese seldom 
considered this tendency of doing practical applied science as loss of professional 
autonomy. However, we should notice that, even in such circumstances, the Chinese 
scientists also continuously worked on less practical research and published their works 
in western journals. Their achievements were among the most valuable scientific 
discoveries at that time. I will give specific examples later to illustrate this history, which 
illuminates the motivations of these scientists and their flexibility in adapting to 
constantly changing conditions. 
 
Tsinghua	University	in	Early	Republican	China	
        Agricultural scientists at Tsinghua University are good case studies of how the dual-
identity enabled and facilitated American-trained Chinese scientists to adapt to the 
chaotic context in Republican China. Firstly, the establishment and early development of 
Tsinghua University was largely relying on the Boxer Scholarship and the United States; 
therefore it may represent a tension between the Chinese and the foreigners. Secondly, 
during the decades when the agricultural scientists were working at Tsinghua University, 
Tsinghua was far away from the KMT central government and far away from the political 
center. The University had to find a balance between the central and local governments. 
Therefore, it is a good example to illustrate the tension between different political forces. 
Thirdly, agricultural sciences are a type of knowledge that may be applied to both 
practical use and fundamental research. Therefore, the strategies of these scientists may 
reflect how the Chinese scientists found a balance between the identity of “Chinese” and 
the identity of “scientist.” 
        It is necessary to briefly introduce the establishment of Tsinghua University before 
exploring its agricultural studies. Because of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Qing 
Empire was fined an indemnity of four hundred and fifty million taels of silver to the 
Eight-Nation Alliance. This indemnity claim took 39 years to extinguish and, with an 
annual interest of 4%, required over nine hundred and eighty-two million taels (about US 
$726 million at that time). The United States shared 7.32% of this indemnity. However, 
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the Qing government quickly argued that the Boxer Protocol awarded the U.S. more than 
it should have demanded. After a seven-year negotiation, the U.S. government (under 
President Theodore Roosevelt) agreed to use the surplus portion to set up a scholarship 
program for Chinese students to study practical knowledge such as engineering, 
agriculture, and medicine in the United States. For China, this program was meant to 
bring in advanced scientific and technical knowledge. For the U.S., it was a chance to 
export American culture and influence to China. This program started to select and 
prepare Chinese students to study in the U.S. in 1909, and Tsinghua College began as a 
preparatory school in April, 1911 with part of the first remission.9  
        At first, this school provided education at the level of secondary school and the first 
two years of college. Students at Tsinghua College received education to prepare for 
further studies in the U.S. However, during the late 1910s and the early 1920s, scholars at 
Tsinghua decided that, if they were contented with the status of a preparatory school, 
Tsinghua would lose its roots in Chinese culture. Although early graduates from 
Tsinghua often stressed the humiliation of China, they were also actually trained western-
style and relatively weakly in Chinese knowledge, even though the students themselves 
did not mean to be that way. As a preparatory school, Tsinghua was more like a 
secondary school or junior college at first. Its students were only prepared to go to an 
American university rather than to work or study in China directly. Students and scholars 
from other national universities often laughed at Tsinghua students for their poor 
knowledge and skill as Chinese people. In addition, the school was completely dependent 
on the refund of US Boxer indemnity. If this situation continued, whenever the Boxer 
Scholarship finished, Tsinghua School would be finished.10  
To avoid such a fate, in 1925 Tsinghua set up its college department to provide 
full college education. About two thirds of the annual fee from the Boxer Scholarship 
was used to support the college. The newly-established college was able to get the best 
faculty in China because its alumni who had received graduate degrees from the U.S. 
                                                 
9 Ye, Weili, Seeking Modernity in China's Name: Chinese students in the United States, 1900-
1927, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 10. 
10 Historical Materials of Tsinghua University, Vol. 1, pp. 276-277. 
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were likely to come back and work at Tsinghua. In addition, Tsinghua’s financial support 
was much more stable than other famous universities supported by Chinese governments, 
which made it very attractive for students. By 1928, when the KMT government took 
over Tsinghua, this school had become one of the best universities in China. Many of its 
early graduates later became very outstanding scientists in both republican and post-1949 
China, and three of them were leading researchers at the Tsinghua IOA, the focus 
institute of this paper. 
III.	Dual‐Identity	of	Two	Agricultural	Scientists	at	Tsinghua	IOA	
        Actually, the fact that Tsinghua University itself was funded by the Boxer Indemnity 
was definitely a stimulus to induce the identity of being “Chinese” for Tsinghua 
scientists, while the advantages of receiving the best education in both China and the U.S. 
implied their capability in scientific studies. All eight professors from three divisions of 
the Tsinghua IOA along with their students and assistants may exemplify the dual-
identity. Considering the representativeness of examples and the availability of archives, 
I will focus on the lives of two agricultural scientists at Tsinghua—Dai Fanglan (戴芳澜) 
and Tang Peisong (汤佩松) (see Figure 4.)—in this part to illustrate how the dual-identity 
influenced the career and life of scientists in Republican China.  
Dai	Fanglan’s	Early	Career	and	the	Uneasy	Lives	of	the	First‐Generation	
Chinese	Scientists	
        Dai Fanglan may be considered as a member of the “first-generation” of American-
trained Chinese scientists. His life exemplified the dual-identity of the first-generation 
scientists: they held contradictory attitudes towards foreign countries. On the one hand, 
they actively accepted resources from foreign sources; on the other hand, they felt deep 
humiliation for foreigners’ superiority over Chinese people because of China’s 
disadvantage in modern social institutions and scientific knowledge.  
        Dai Fanglan was born in Zhenhai, Zejiang Province on May 3rd, 1893. He was the 
third son of a scholar-gentry family. His grandfather and father had been chief officials at 
several counties in Zhejiang Province. Sponsored by their uncle Dai Zhenchuo, Dan 
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Fanglan and his elder brother were able to take western style elementary and secondary 
education in Shanghai. They graduated from high school in 1910, the year when the Qing 
Government started the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program. After a one-year 
preparation, Dai Fanglan passed the exam and was admitted to Tsinghua College at the 
age of eighteen. He studied at this college for two years to prepare for college education 
in the United States.11  
        According to the original agreement between the Qing Empire and the U.S. 
government, over 80% of the selected Boxer students had to major in applied knowledge 
such as engineering, agriculture, medicine, business and law. The Republican 
governments followed this rule. In actual practice, the Boxer students had the freedom to 
change their universities and majors. For example, Hu Shi (胡适), one of the first 
generation Boxer students, transferred from agriculture to philosophy at Cornell 
University. However, Hu Shi was only an exceptional case. Most Boxer students stayed 
in sciences and engineering. In his autobiography, Dai Fanglan explained the reason of 
his choosing agriculture as a major, which apparently suggested a motivation of 
patriotism and scientific nationalism: 
        “…foreigners were continuously insulting our country. Youths at that 
era were all filled with righteous patriotism and wished our country to 
become stronger very soon. Most young people prefer to study practical 
knowledge rather than humanities in order to make China stronger. Therefore 
I chose agriculture as my major. I thought that the United States had 
advanced agricultural sciences. In addition, it was a democratic and advanced 
country and might be a model for our development.”12  
         Nevertheless, just like most first-generation American-trained Chinese scientists, 
while acknowledging the democracy and advancement of the United States, Dai Fanglan 
did not forget the humiliations for China brought by this country. 
        In 1914 Dai Fanglan entered the College of Agriculture in University of Wisconsin-
Madison. It was the era when H. L. Russell and J. L. Ralph were building up the studies 
                                                 
11 Cheng Guangsheng, Biography of Dai Fanglan, pp. 5-10. 
12 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 10-11 
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of microbiology and plant pathology in the United States. Dai Fanglan was the first 
Chinese student to study plant pathology in America. For two years, Dai Fanglan had 
focused on mycology and agronomy at the University of Wisconsin. It was during this 
period that he joined the Science Society of China (SSC), the first Chinese scientific 
association established by his Tsinghua seniors in the Cornell University in 1915. The 
SSC was organized by a group of Chinese students at Cornell University in 1914. The 
first issue of its monthly journal, Kexue (Science), was published in January 1915, which 
signified the formal establishment of the Science Society. Among the nine founders of 
the SSC, seven were sponsored by the Boxer scholarship and were therefore Tsinghua 
alumni.13 Dai Fanglan’s Cornell colleagues encouraged him to introduce other Chinese 
students in Wisconsin into this society. Two years later, in fall 1916, Dai Fanglan 
transferred to the School of Agriculture in Cornell University, considered by some to be 
the best agricultural school in the United States.14  He took mycology and plant pathology 
courses of George Francis Atkinson, Herbert Hice Whetzel15, Harry Morton Fitzpatrick, 
Joseph Charles Arthur, and Charles David Chupp. Under the direction of Whetzel, Dai 
Fanglan got more field practice as an undergraduate student. He developed a strong 
interest in plant pathology and mycology during the two years in Cornell. 
        In 1918, Dai Fanglan entered the graduate school in Columbia University. His 
advisor was Professor Robert Almer Harper. Dai Fanglan’s studies during the Columbia 
period were on cellular biology and taxonomy of fungi. He also developed a good 
relationship with Bernard Ogilvie Dodge, an American scientist from University of 
                                                 
13 Wang Zuoyue, “Saving China through Science: the Science Society of China, Scientific 
Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China”, Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 17, Science and 
Civil Society (2002), pp. 291-322. 
14 Several Tsinghua students had already studied at Cornell before Dai Fanglan. For example, 
Bing Zhi (秉志, 1886-1965) studied there between 1909 and 1913 and later received a PhD 
degree from the department of biology; Guo Tanxian (过探先, 1886-1926) received a master’s 
degree in 1915; Zou Bingwen (邹秉文, 1893-1985) received a bachelor degree in 1915 and then 
studied plant pathology for one year before going back to China in 1916. 
15 Herbert H. Whetzel directed two other prominent Chinese agricultural scientists to finish their 
doctorate dissertations: Deng Shuqun in 1928 and Lin Chuanguang (林传光) in 1940.  
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Wisconsin. After returning to China, Dai Fanglan kept in communication with Harper 
and Dodge for many years.16 
        Dai Fanglan’s studies in Columbia proceeded smoothly. However, his father was 
unemployed in 1919, and the whole family was falling into a difficult situation. Dai 
Fanglan had to give up his study in America to go back home and to earn a living for the 
family.17 From 1919 to 1925, he worked at several organizations. Dai Fanglan’s early 
career in China demonstrates the political instability of the times. As mentioned before, 
the decade from the late 1910s to 1928 was a period of high warlordism. China was 
actually controlled by more than ten warlords competing with each other. Some of these 
warlords were receiving funding and support from foreign countries such as the US, 
Japan, and USSR. Therefore, it was very hard for American-trained Chinese scientists 
and educationists in China to fully concentrate on scientific works without interference 
from politics. They had to deal with such complicated political situations and to balance 
so many political forces—local and foreign—just to survive and maintain their lives, 
while their overseas experience sometimes made it impossible for them to stay away 
from political and interpersonal collisions.  
        Dai Fanglan’s first position in China was to teach botany related courses at the 
Jiangsu Provincial First Agricultural School (江苏省立第一农校). This appointment was 
encouraged by Guo Tanxian, who was chairing the secondary school at that time. Most of 
Dai Fanglan’s colleagues were American-trained Chinese scientists such as Qian 
Chongshu (钱崇澍), Sun Yushu (孙玉书), and Chen Zongyi (陈宗一, also named Chen 
Rong, 陈嵘). Lin Chuanguang (林传光) was a student at this school at that time. He was 
also Dai Fanglan’s student later at Jinda and then a PhD student at Cornell University. 
However, Guo Tanxian resigned in 1920 because of interpersonal conflicts and all of the 
American-trained teachers left this school. Qian Chongshu was employed by Tsinghua 
                                                 
16 Cheng Guangsheng, p. 14 and p. 32. 
17 I would like to make a comparison between Dai Fanglan and Shen Zonghan, another great 
Chinese agricultural scientist and Cornell University alumnus. Shen Zonghan insisted on 
finishing his education despite the fact that his father strongly opposed this decision and that his 
family had been in heavy debt for decades. In this sense, Dai Fanglan was still following 
traditional Chinese ethics to fulfill his filial duty. 
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and many others later joined the University of Nanking. Dai Fanglan had no interest in 
factional conflicts, but he was forced to leave this school as well. His eldest brother Dai 
Lianjiang was working in Tianjin at that time and introduced Dai Fanglan to work at a 
private farm in Tianjin (1920-1921). Dai Fanglan felt deeply depressed at this job 
because he could neither use the scientific knowledge he had learned nor do anything 
contributive to the country.18  
One year later, he transferred to the Guangdong Agricultural Specialized School (
广东省农业专门学校) and taught there from 1921 to 1923. This school was chaired by 
Deng Zhiyi (邓植仪, 1888-1957),19 Dai Fanglan’s friend at the University of Wisconsin. 
However, this school had no guaranteed financial support because of warfare among 
warlords and the nationalist party in the early 1920s. Dai Fanglan was not paid and had to 
move to the Southeast University in Nanjing in 1923. The position at Southeast 
University allowed him to conduct serious scientific research. Nevertheless, this good 
situation was soon interrupted by interpersonal conflicts. Guo Bingwen, the chair and 
founder of the agricultural school in Southeast University, was dismissed in 1926 because 
of strife among warlords. As an American-trained scientist and a friend of Guo Bingwen, 
Dai Fanglan encountered hostility from some colleagues with different political concepts 
and was dismissed as well. During the following summer, Dai Fanglan got in touch with 
Guo Tanxian, the chair of agricultural school in University of Nanking, who hired him in 
the fall of 1927.20  
                                                 
18 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 19-20. 
19 Deng Zhiyi was a soil scientist and agricultural educationalist from Guangdong province. 
Different from Tsinghua alumni such as Dai Fanglan and Tang Peisong who had been sponsored 
by the Boxer scholarship, Deng Zhiyi studied in the United States at his own expense. He traveled 
to America in 1909, studied at the California State University for half a year, and then transferred 
to University of Wisconsin and majored in soil science. Deng Zhiyi returned China in 1915 after 
receiving a M.S. degree.  He chaired the Guangdong Agricultural Specialized School since 1920 
and the agricultural school in the National Sun Yat-sen University from 1932 to 1940. Deng Zhiyi 
was also the first Chinese soil scientist to attend an international conference—from July to 
August 1935, he attended at the Third International Conference on Soil Science at the University 
of Oxford , where he made presentation and introduced the surveys and research of soil in 
Guangdong province. See the online archives of the Sun Yat-Sen University, 
http://gjs.sysu.edu.cn/zsdxxs/ms/9627.htm. 
20 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 22-26. 
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        After occupational uncertainty for almost eight years, Dai Fanglan settled down at 
the University of Nanking (金陵大学, the Chinese name reads as Jinling Daxue, and I 
will use “Jinda” for short). This was a missionary university supported by American 
funding, so it was able to protect its faculty and students from the chaotic warlordism. 
Compared with the earlier farm and schools, Jinda provided Dai much more stable and 
superior conditions for both his life and research. He was appointed as professor and 
director of the program of plant pathology. However, he had never felt fully comfortable 
at this university because of its missionary background and had been looking forward to 
somewhere more comfortable for him. 
        His attitude towards Jinda (from 1927 to 1934) exemplified the complex feelings of 
“first generation” Chinese scientists trained abroad, who returned to work at American-
sponsored institutions. Dai Fanglan commented on his experience at Jinda that:  
        “Jinda was a missionary university, which I did not like to join in. 
However, I was unemployed at that time and not able to find anywhere else to 
settle down. … I often conflicted with foreigners because of their offending 
Chinese people. … Our living condition in Jinda was very comfortable and the 
research condition was also very satisfactory. However, I sincerely wished to 
move to some other place because of a sense of national pride. Therefore, when 
received the invitation from Tsinghua, I accepted this opportunity at once.”21  
Dai Fanglan’s displeasure at Jinda was mainly toward ideas of imperialism and 
colonialism behind these missionary schools instead of his American colleagues.22 He 
had always felt humiliated by the fact that foreign scientists enjoyed more privileges than 
Chinese scientists on the land of China. Dai Fanglan acknowledged that western 
researchers’ works had significantly contributed to the development of science in China. 
He also had to admit that Chinese scientists had not been capable of conducting 
systematic scientific research in many fields. However, he felt ashamed of the fact that 
western scientists were unrestricted in using research resources in China while Chinese 
                                                 
21 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 26-30. 
22 For Chinese people’s paradoxical attitude towards Christian schools, see Daniel H. Bays, 
China’s Christian Colleges: Cross-Cultural Connections, 1900-1950, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009.  
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scientists were so non-competitive. Dai’s strong feelings of the dual-identity of being 
both Chinese and a scientist, especially “Chinese pride” significantly influenced his 
choice of research topics, which I will explore later.  
        During his eight years in Jinda, Dai Fanglan made significant advances in research 
about plant pathology and mycology. From 1929 to 1934, he published twelve research 
articles in academic journals in China (with two coauthored with Wei Jingchao, and one 
coauthored with Zhou Jiachi). By 1933, his monthly salary had reached 270 CND, among 
three of the highest paid professors at the school of agriculture in Jinda (the two others 
were Chen Zongyi and Shen Zonghan)23. But these achievements did not relieve his 
feeling of humiliation. In 1934, Dai was planning to leave Jinda and had arranged a two-
year research trip to New York Botanical Garden and Cornell University. At this time, he 
received an invitation from Tsinghua to direct a group of plant pathology at the newly 
established institute of agriculture—the group where he spent the rest of his career.24  
        Dai Fanglan is a good example of the first-generation Chinese scientists who got 
their education in the West and returned to China. They were more constrained by 
complex political situations than the second generation and faced a dearth of developed 
scientific institutions. They felt the humiliation of being semi-colonial while working at 
universities sponsored by foreign money, and watching Chinese colleagues suffer for lack 
of resources. Meanwhile, the number of this generation was relatively small, which 
meant that they did not need to worry too much about competing for academic positions. 
Therefore they paid more attention to building the infrastructure in China that would 
enable them to practice science as they had seen in the West, but in a distinctly Chinese 
way which allowed them to adapt to the chaotic environment in Republican China.  
 
                                                 
23 Shen Zonghan, Memoirs of the Middle Age, p. 28. 
24 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 27-32 and p. 37. 
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Tang	Peisong	and	the	Younger‐Generation	Chinese	Scientists’	
Enthusiasm	in	Scientific	Research									
        Compared with Dai Fanglan, Tang Peisong belonged to a younger generation of 
scientists who shared more common professional characteristics with their western 
colleagues, such as being more devoted to academic research rather than focusing on 
establishing new institution or on political activities. This shift of western-trained 
Chinese scientists was largely because of changes in their professional environment. 
During the decades after 1928, when more and more high-level universities and research 
institutes had been established in China, the second-generation scientists were able to 
work in more established professional environment than that of the first generation—but 
as the number of scientists increased significantly, they also needed to demonstrate much 
higher scientific research ability to compete for a chance to work in this better 
environment. They were more capable of creating more advanced scientific knowledge to 
help China, of becoming important in international science, and sometimes (but not 
always) of applying their achievements to agricultural and industrial production to 
improve China’s strength. The younger-generation of scientists’ self-identity of being 
Chinese and the love for their country were as strong as their precursors. They just 
expressed this love in some different ways. 
        Tang Peisong (1903-2001) is a good example. He was born into a revolutionist 
family. His father Tang Hualong (汤化龙, 1874-1918) was a jurist, journalist, and 
politician and had taken important positions in the republican government, such as 
congress chairman and minister of education. Because of his political dissent, Tang 
Hualong was murdered by the KMT (the Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1918. Possibly due 
to the suffering of his father, Tang Peisong never had any positive opinion of the KMT 
government, even though he had been a passionate patriot all through his life.25 
        Tang Peisong took secondary education at Tsinghua College from 1917 to 1925. He 
described the Tsinghua fund in his memoirs with strong emotion: 
        “The Tsinghua fund was from the returned part of the Boxer Indemnity. 
                                                 
25 Tang Peisong, Wei Jie Zhao Xia Gu Xi Yang, p. 1 and p. 40.  
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Figure 4. Dai Fanglan in 1918 (left) and Tang Peisong in the 1940s (right) 
 
 
Figure 5. Yin Hongzhang, Tang Peisong, and Lou Chenghou in the 1980s 
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This indemnity was extorted by an Eight-Nation Alliance whose troops traveled 
overseas to invade and plunder our country land and to insult the Qing 
government. My schoolmates and I were educated with the four hundred and 
fifty million taels of fine silver from four hundred and fifty million Chinese 
people (over ninety percent of whom were poor people); that is, each Chinese 
person donated one tael of blood to cultivate us. I still feel profoundly guilty and 
grateful up to the present… I encouraged myself with the country’s humiliation 
and swore to study hard in order to reciprocate favours bestowed by the 
country.”26 
This quotation suggests one component of “love of China” for both the first and the 
second-generation American-trained Chinese scientists: they felt guilt and a passion 
to help China become strong and important in international science, because they 
owed their education to their countrymen. In addition, this strong feeling was not a 
love for the political nation, but love for the social and cultural countrymen. All the 
three leading scientists in Tsinghua IOA including Tang Peisong were alumni of 
Tsinghua College, and the younger Tsinghua IOA researchers who later studied in the 
United States were all sponsored by the Boxer scholarship. As Tang articulated, this 
sponsorship had stimulated them to respond to the reality that their country was still 
in dire suffering and the best way for them to save the country and to repay their debt 
was their knowledge and its application. 
        Under the suggestion of Tu Zhi (涂治), his friend at Tsinghua, Tang Peisong came 
to the agricultural school in University of Minnesota in 1925.27 But he quickly transferred 
to the school of liberal arts because of a strong interest in pure research to explore the 
foundations of biology. He studied botany under William Cooper. During this period, 
Tang Peisong was exposed to the general physiology of Jacques Loeb and this raised his 
                                                 
26 Tang Peisong, pp. 1-2. 
27 Along with Tang Peisong, there were at least three other Chinese students at the UMN 
agricultural school—Tu Zhi, Zhang Kewei (张克威), and Sun Qingbo (孙清波). All of them 
returned to China and became leaders in the agricultural sciences. Zhang Kewei (1901-1974) was 
an animal husbandry scientist. He was the founder and first president of the Shenyang 
Agricultural College. Sun Qingbo had chaired the department of agricultural mechanics in the 
National Central University (Nanjing University) after 1948. 
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strong interest in exploring the fundamental nature of living creatures with physical and 
chemical principles. In summer 1927, Tang Peisong received his B.A. degree and won 
the first prize. He then was admitted by the plant physiology laboratory of Burton E. 
Livingston in the Johns Hopkins University and was deeply impressed by its graduate 
school. Ten years later, after becoming a professor in Tsinghua, he modeled his own 
research group after JHU’s advanced education. Tang Peisong received his Ph.D. degree 
in the summer of 1930. Then he spent the summers in 1930 and 1931 working as a 
research assistant at Woods Hole Marine Biological Laboratory, where he published two 
articles about the respiration intensity of sea urchins and asters, and tested the level of 
phosphagen in the lobster’s nerve conduction. During these summers, Tang Peisong got a 
chance to participate in the lectures and discussions of Otto H. Warburg, Leonor 
Michaelis, Frank and Ralph Lillie, Archibald Vivian Hill, and Otto Meyerhof. Influenced 
by these scientists, Tang Peisong decided to choose thermodynamics of plant respiration 
and photosynthesis as his lifelong career.28  
        From September 1930 to August 1933, Tang Peisong worked as a fellowship 
researcher and instructor at William John Crozier’s laboratory of general physiology at 
Harvard University. However, Tang Peisong’s understanding of in situ activation energy 
was quite different from the hypothesis of Crozier and they two did not get along with 
each other very well (later scientific discoveries have demonstrated that Tang was 
right).29 Tang Peisong started to contact universities in China for a faculty position. In 
spring 1933, he received an invitation from the National Wuhan University with an offer 
of $2,000 to launch a laboratory.30  
        When considering the Tsinghua IOA scientists’ returning to China after their 
training in the US, we should remember that their affection for the country was not 
directly applicable to specific governments. For these scientists maturing in the early 
twentieth century, the country had been torn by warlordism for decades and the KMT 
central government was not necessarily representative of China for them. Most of these 
                                                 
28 Tang Peisong, pp. 30-32. 
29 Tang Peisong, chapter 5. 
30 This opportunity was arranged by Ren Hongjun (任鸿隽), Tang Hualong’s close friend and one 
of the founders of the Science Society of China. Tang Peisong, chapter 6. 
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scientists were merely indifferent in politics, while a few of them were radical democrats 
and some were socialists. However, because of a sense of belonging, their self-identities 
as Chinese people were quite similar, and this encouraged them to return to build a 
stronger China. Tang Peisong explained this in his memoir:  
        “The fund from [Robert] Marshall31 may guarantee my career and life 
in the U.S. Then why did I insist on giving up this fund and returning to 
chaotic China—China under the government of a party murdering my father 
in 1918? … Now I have got the answer: although my life in the U.S. has 
been very comfortable, there has always been a sense reminding me that I 
don’t belong here.”32 
Tang returned to China because he loved the country, but not the nation governed 
by the KMT party (the so-called Chinese Nationalist Party). It was the sense of 
“belonging to China” as a cultural and social entity, not a political one, that 
motivated Chinese scientists such as Tang to study in the U.S. and to return China 
to apply their knowledge to the social problems of their homeland. They wanted to 
use the advanced knowledge in science and engineering they had learned abroad to 
improve and rebuild their country despite the turbulent political situation. 
       Tang Peisong went back to China, where he started working at the National Wuhan 
University in fall 1933. He was the first scientist to teach and research general physiology 
in Chinese universities. From 1933 to 1937, he organized other physiologists to compile 
textbooks and to teach physiology courses in Chinese, established a laboratory of cellular 
physiology and general physiology, and invited several other western-trained scientists to 
join his research, including Lin Chunyou (林春猷), Gao Shangmeng (高尚萌), Wu 
Maoyi (吴懋仪), Yin Hongzhang (殷宏章), Zhang Xincheng (张信诚), and Shen Qiyi (
沈其益). (See Figure 5.) From 1936 to 1938, Tang Peisong, Lin Chunyou, and Wu 
                                                 
31 Robert Marshall was Tang Peisong’s labmate and close friend in the Johns Hopkins University. 
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Maoyi published seven articles on the thermodynamics of cellular respiration in Journal 
of Cellular and Comparative Physiology. This group was at a very promising stage when 
the July 7 Incident33 broke out. This incident refers to the battle between Japanese and 
Chinese armies near Peiping on July 7th, 1937. It marks Japanese troops’ comprehensive 
invasion of China and the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The war completely 
disrupted the physiology group, forcing them to move and adapt to new circumstances. 
        By the end of 1937, Tang Peisong was faced with three choices—he could stay with 
Wuhan University, which would retreat to Leshan (乐山) in Sichuan Province; he could 
obey the Ministry of Education, which had instructed him along with several medical 
scientists from Peiping and Nanjing to establish a medical college in Guiyang, Guizhou 
province; or he could accept the offer of Mei Yiqi, the Tsinghua president, who sent him 
a letter inviting him to join the Tsinghua IOA to organize a plant physiology research 
group. Tang Peisong was most interested in plant physiology and its economic 
applications, so his preference was to join Tsinghua IOA in Yunnan province. However, 
he also felt obligated to help the medical scientists. As a result, he first spent half a year 
establishing the Guiyang Medical College (March to August 1938), and then traveled to 
Kunming to start his research at Tsinghua IOA in August 1938.34   
        While Dai Fanglan’s patriotic activities were located mainly in universities and 
academic circles, Tang Peisong’s love for China and desire to serve his country seemed 
to be much more radical and showed in many ways. When the July 7 Incident broke out, 
Tang Peisong was extremely lost at the beginning and wondered what he could do for the 
nation. He quickly took two actions—first, recording BBC’s reports about the Anti-
Japanese War and spreading this international perspective with leaflets among faculty 
and students at the National Wuhan University; and, he applied to join the KMT army to 
fight against the Japanese. The first action lasted for about one month and was very 
popular. Obviously, Tang could not have done this without his western experience and 
language skills. However, Wang Xinggong (王星拱), president of the Wuhan University, 
told him that some secret service members in the KMT government were investigating 
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and punishing any activity that spread news different from official reports of the KMT 
central government. So Tang Peisong had to give up his leaflets. As for joining the army, 
only one military official treated Tang Peisong’s application seriously: General Hu 
Zongnan (胡宗南) invited Tang Peisong to join his troops in Shaanxi (Northwest China) 
to suppress CCP in Yan’an, which was unacceptable for Tang Peisong. Disappointed by 
the KMT government and army, Tang Peisong reassessed the situation and realized that 
the best and only reasonable way for him to serve his country during this crisis was 
scientific research and its applications to increase agricultural and industrial production.35 
        Tang’s life is an excellent example of how “love for China” and being a scientist 
created this dual-identity. At Tsinghua IOA, even the younger passionate patriots found 
that practicing science was the best way to serve their country. It is understandable that in 
the chaotic atmosphere of wartime China, researchers at the Tsinghua IOA presented 
their identity of being Chinese in many aspects other than science. Some patriotic 
activities involved political issues. However, usually these scientists would return to 
scientific studies. One example is Zhou Jiachi’s travels to Northwest China. Zhou Jiachi 
(1911- ) took his college education at the School of Agriculture in Jinda from 1928 to 
1932. He first entered the department of agronomy but then transferred to pathology in 
order to study under Dai Fanglan. He was highly devoted in scientific studies but also 
enthusiastic in patriotic activities. After the September 18 Incident36, Zhou Jiachi 
participated in a series of public activities to appeal to the KMT government to resist 
Japanese invasion and to encourage Chinese compatriots in anti-Japanese activities. He 
even missed some courses and experiments required for his education—fortunately 
professor Dai Fanglan never blamed him for the absence but helped him to catch up and 
finish the B.S. thesis.37 After working as a research assistant in Lingnan University for 
one year, Zhou Jiachi joined the Tsinghua IOA at Dai Fanglan’s invitation. He had 
substantial achievements in plant pathology research and published four articles during 
                                                 
35 Tang Peisong, pp. 60-65. 
36 The Japanese troops occupied Northeast China after September 18, 1931. 
37 Cheng Guangsheng, p. 27. 
  29 
the three years in Peiping.38 However, Zhou Jiachi had felt extremely depressed after the 
July 7 Incident. When hearing the Tsinghua university committee’s decision to suspend 
the IOA in January 1938, he decided almost at once to leave the university and travel to 
Northwest China in order to do something for the country more directly.39 From January 
to June 1938, Zhou Jiachi traveled to Yanan and received training at Shanbei Public 
School, a political school training revolutionaries for the CCP. However, when Dai 
Fanglan asked him to return the Tsinghua IOA in June 1938, he returned to his 
mycological and plant pathological studies at once. In Yan’an and returning to Tsinghua 
IOA, Zhou Jiachi was realizing his wish to contribute to the country in practice, by using 
his scientific knowledge and skills. 40 
        The life stories and words of these Tsinghua IOA scientists help us to understand 
their motivations and how they defined “love for China” in social and cultural ways. If 
we merely concentrate on “love for China”, it seems that the concept of “scientific 
nationalism” discussed by earlier historians is enough to describe these scientists’ feeling 
and emotion towards their country and their science. However, it is also important to 
understand the domestic political context of the 1920s and 1930s. During this period, 
China was in a very chaotic and tricky situation when localism coexisted with (and in 
many areas was stronger than) nationalism. Such a situation marked a significant 
difference between the lives and careers of Chinese scientists of this period and those 
after 1949, when the CCP government was much more capable of controlling the entire 
country. The Tsinghua IOA was established and developed at a time when Chinese 
scientists had to sometimes cooperate with and sometimes fight with both the central 
nationalist government (KMT government) and local political forces. The Tsinghua IOA 
scientists had different feelings and attitudes towards these political forces, which would 
remarkably influence their choices and decisions in scientific research and education. In 
                                                 
38 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-88, pp. 10-21, Dai Fanglan’s report on the Division of 
Plant Pathology.  
39 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-40. 
40 Qiu Weifan, “Professor Dai Fanglan”, in Yi En Shi (Recollection on Our Mentors), edited by 
Wu Ruzhuo, Wang Buzheng, and Xu Zenghua, Beijing: Chine’s Agricultural University Press, 
2010. (裘维蕃，“戴芳澜教授”，《忆恩师》，吴汝焯，王步峥，许增华主编，中国农业大
学出版社，2010) 
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the next section, I will describe some of their strategies of negotiating the tensions 
between local needs and central political forces, from the late 1920s through the Sino-
Japanese War (1937-1945).  
IV.	Tensions	between	the	Central	and	Local	Political	Forces	
Early	development	of	the	National	Tsinghua	University	
As a school with a strong foreign background, Tsinghua experienced a remarkable 
shift of “sinicization” in its institution and administration after 1928. From 1912 to 1928, 
the “Beiyang Government” was internationally recognized as the legitimate government 
of the Republic of China, even though it usually could only effectively control several 
provinces in North China. It refers to a series of military regimes ruled by warlords from 
the Beiyang Army of the Qing Government. In June 1928, the National Revolutionary 
Army of the Nanjing KMT government occupied Beijing and unified China (only 
formally). The KMT government became the new legitimate Chinese government with 
international recognition, while local military forces remained powerful in regions far 
away from the reach of the KMT central government. As already described for Tsinghua, 
during the Warlord Era (from 1916 to February 1928), it was always at the national 
capital, ranked as the best school in China, and because of its relations with the US, it 
was under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In contrast, from 1928 to 
1948 (the KMT era and the Sino-Japanese War), Tsinghua was always at a place outside 
of the political center—first in Beiping, later in Kunming during the wartime. This means 
that local support was important for the development of this school. Tsinghua suffered 
another big change: it was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Ministry of Education of the KMT central government. This meant increased scrutiny by 
the KMT. Tsinghua scholars and students had to deal with new situations and to find a 
proper balance between the central and local political forces for its further development. 
Because of a regime change, from February to August 1928, there was no official 
president of the Tsinghua University. When the KMT government believed that they had 
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controlled Beijing and changed the name of this city into Peiping,41 the KMT government 
changed Tsinghua’s name into the “National Tsinghua University” in August 1928 and 
put it under the joint-administration of the ministries of foreign affairs and education. In 
September 1928, Luo Jialun (罗家伦) assumed the presidency of Tsinghua with the 
appointment of the Nanjing government. From 1928 to 1930, Luo Jialun made a series of 
reforms aimed at rebuilding Tsinghua into a university to serve the Chinese people and 
setting up a foundation to develop Tsinghua into a comprehensive research university. 
One of Luo’s most unpopular reforms was to apply military regulations to the students, 
which aimed to improve the students’ discipline and patriotism. Luo’s reforms were 
based on his decisive personality and the support of the KMT central government, while 
the Tsinghua scholars and students, no matter how patriotic they were, had got used to 
the autonomy and freedom brought by its unique background (under the looser control of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not Education). Therefore, although the Tsinghua 
students admitted that Luo was capable and had done a lot of good things for Tsinghua, 
they disliked Luo’s reforms. Moreover, many Tsinghua people preferred other political 
forces to the KMT government. As a result, Luo was expelled by the Tsinghua student 
                                                 
41 In Chinese, “京” (Jing) means the capital of a country. Beijing (or Peking, 北京) means the 
north capital, while Nanjing (or Nanking, 南京) means the south capital. Beiping (or Peiping, 北
平) was an old name of this city and was only used for several decades during the 14th and 15th 
centuries. Local residents had considered this city as a capital for over thousand years. Therefore, 
when the KMT government prohibited the name “Beijing”, it irritated many local people, 
especially university students and scholars. The KMT central government tried to integrate eight 
national universities with “Beijing” in their names into a new “Peiping University”, which further 
angered students and scholars of these universities. Students launched movements such as strikes 
and protest marches to protect their schools. From 1928 to 1929, Peking University was almost 
closed because of students’ strike, and students from the normal universities received violent 
suppression from the government. Finally the Nanjing government gave up and publically 
abolished the decision to integrate these universities in summer 1929. Peking University 
remained its independence with a name as the “National Peking (Beijing) University”, while the 
Peking Normal University united with the Peking Women’s Normal University and received a 
new name of the “National Peiping Normal University” in 1931. Tsinghua was not directly 
involved in these conflicts because of its relations with the US and its unique status among 
Chinese universities, but it also had its own struggles during this shifting period.  
  32 
union in 1930.42 In the following paragraphs, I will briefly introduce Luo’s reforms and 
how the thoughts and careers of Tsinghua scientists would be influenced by these events. 
The purpose of Luo’s reform was to make Tsinghua a university to improve 
China’s own academics (“我去办理清华，除谋中国的学术独立外，他无目的”). He 
proposed three principal concerns for Tsinghua’s future development: first, the sciences 
China needed; second, Tsinghua’s existing basis; and third, local conditions of Peiping.43 
Luo’s reforms were carried out mainly in four aspects. Firstly, Luo moved the 
administration of Tsinghua to the Ministry of Education of the Nanjing KMT government 
completely. From then on, Tsinghua was to be under the management of the Chinese 
government—at least in form.44 Secondly, Luo moved the administration of the 
“Tsinghua fund” from the minister of foreign affairs to directors of the “China 
Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture” (“China Foundation” for short). 
These directors were non-governmental famous people from both China and the US. This 
move was in part calculated to reduce corruption and mismanagement of funds. Thirdly 
and fourthly, he re-organized the departments and re-allocated funds. Luo Jialun 
increased inputs in purchasing academic books and scientific research equipment and 
materials, expanded the library, set up more buildings for research and education, and, 
correspondingly, cut off some programs he believed to be redundant—including the 
program of agriculture. This program had an important history in the early development 
of Tsinghua School, and scholars have not paid much attention to it (indeed no published 
history exists). 
At the very beginning of its establishment in the early 1910s, Tsinghua had a 
mandate to build up an agriculture program. Its college students organized an association 
of agriculture to prepare for further study in agricultural sciences in the United States.  In 
                                                 
42 Li Jingqing, “Storms at Tsinghua”, September 1930, Historical Materials of Tsinghua 
University, Vol. 2(1), pp. 82-86. (李景清，“清华学潮的前后”，1930年 9月，《清华大学史
料选编》，二（上），82-86页). 
43 Luo Jialun, “Reports and Plans for Reforming University Affairs” (“整理校务之经过及计划”), 
November 23, 1928, Historical Materials of Tsinghua University, Vol. 2 (1), p. 5. 
44 In practice, part of the Tsinghua scholars and students did not accept this fact heartily. In 
addition, some times the leaders of Tsinghua also stressed their American background in order to 
claim more benefit.  
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1921, Yu Zhenyong (虞振镛), a Tsinghua College graduate with an M.S. degree in 
animal husbandry from Cornell University, organized a program of agriculture and 
provided optional courses such as crop science, horticultural science and animal 
husbandry for college students at the Tsinghua College. This program was changed into a 
department in 1926, with Yu Zhenyong as the director. Yu Zhenyong continued teaching 
optional courses for college students and did not enroll students for the agricultural 
program. In 1928, when Tsinghua was reformed into the National Tsinghua University, 
this department had only one faculty member (Yu Zhenyong) and no full-time students. 
Tsinghua President Luo Jialun believed that this program was not running well and 
therefore closed it. Yu Zhenyong continued agricultural activities by collaborating with 
other organizations, such as the National Association of Mass Education Movements led 
by Yan Yangchu (晏阳初, Y. C. James Yen) and the Yenching University.45 Together 
they established an experimental farm to conduct research on livestock breeding. At the 
same time, in 1928, they started an agricultural school to provide training for practical 
farming technicians and literate peasants. The experimental farm and the school did not 
run well either and was finally suspended in 1930 when Yenching University decided to 
give up. At the request of Yenching University, the University of Nanking (Jinda) took 
over the experimental farm. Researchers from the School of Agriculture in the University 
of Nanking kept this farm for their studies in plant breeding. Yu Zhenyong left and joined 
the School of Agriculture in the National Peiping University.46 
Meanwhile, Luo’s reorganizations received both positive and negative comments, 
while his militarization program irritated both students and faculty at Tsinghua. Because 
of its background, Tsinghua had high autonomy and a strong democratic atmosphere 
before 1928. It also had a unique tradition of “professors managing the school” (“教授治
                                                 
45 Yenching University was the best missionary university in north China and its campus 
neighbored Tsinghua’s campus. The University of Nanking (Jinda) was the best missionary 
university in Nanjing and had the best agricultural school in China at that time. 
46 “The Agriculture Department’s Effort in China’s Agricultural Improvement and Education”, by 
Zhu Junpeng from the Tsinghua University Archives (“注重中国农业改良的农业学系”，朱俊
鹏，清华大学档案馆) 
http://xs.tsinghua.edu.cn/docinfo/board/boarddetail.jsp?columnId=00401&parentColumnId=004
&itemSeq=5352.  
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校”)—when facing important events, the professors would get together and vote to make 
important decisions. Luo’s strong and arbitrary personality enabled him to make the 
reforms quickly and efficiently, but also challenged Tsinghua’s democratic tradition 
significantly. He was tolerated by Tsinghua people for almost two years mainly because 
of two reasons: firstly, his reforms really benefited Tsinghua; and secondly, he was 
supported by the KMT central government. But this situation did not last long. 
In spring 1930, the “Central Plains War” broke out. It was a civil war between the 
forces of the KMT government and a coalition of three warlords: Feng Yuxiang (冯玉祥) 
controlling Shaanxi, Gansu, Henan, and part of the Inner Mongolia; Yan Xishan (阎锡山) 
controlling Shanxi province; and Li Zongren (李宗仁) controlling Guangxi province in 
south China. This war involved more than ten provinces and lasted for about six months. 
The KMT government lost its control over Peiping during the summer. As a result, Luo 
Jialun lost his political support.  
On May 20, 1930, some radical students took advantage of the situation and 
launched an “Expelling Luo Movement” (“倒罗运动”), supported by the student union. 
Luo Jialun was forced to resign and went back to Nanjing. But the student union and the 
faculty soon noticed that the radical students starting the movement were not thinking 
about Tsinghua’s benefit and development at all but were followers of Yan Xishan, the 
warlord controlling Peiping at that time. In June 1930, Yan Xishan appointed Qiao 
Wanxuan (乔万选) to be Tsinghua’s president. The Tsinghua student union and faculty 
committee believed that Qiao was not qualified to be their president and firmly rejected 
this appointment. After winning the Central Plains War and gaining Peiping back, the 
KMT government tried to send Luo Jialun back to Tsinghua—but both Luo and the 
Tsinghua side refused this proposal. In April 1931, the KMT government appointed Wu 
Nanxuan (吴南轩) as the Tsinghua president. Just one month later, the Tsinghua students 
and scholars claimed that Wu Nanxuan was even worse than Luo Jialun in both 
personality and capability and started another “Expelling Wu Movement” (“驱吴运动”). 
Wu was forced to resign on June 5, 1931.  
  35 
         The conflict between Tsinghua and the governments lasted for over a year and 
finally got resolved in October 1931, when Mei Yiqi (梅贻琦) became the new president. 
Mei was the one acceptable for both Tsinghua and the KMT government. He was an 
early graduate from the Tsinghua School and had worked as the university dean from 
1928 to 1930. Therefore he was very familiar with Tsinghua’s traditions and knew how 
to handle the strong feeling of the Tsinghua faculty and students. In addition, he had 
worked in the KMT government and knew how to deal with the politicians. From 1931, 
Mei Yiqi was Tsinghua president for over 17 years and he was considered as the most 
successful president (although many of his actions were following the ways designed by 
Luo Jialun). After struggling between the desire to maintain democratic autonomy and 
the desire to be the school of Chinese people for several years, Tsinghua people finally 
found a balance and compromise under Mei, and the Tsinghua scientists were able to 
settle down and apply their knowledge to serve China. During this productive and stable 
period (1931 to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937), the Tsinghua Institute of 
Agriculture (清华大学农业研究所, Tsinghua IOA) was established. The interesting 
story of Tsinghua IOA’s founding and wartime survival unites the political tensions I 
have just discussed with the life histories of the two scientists, Dai Fanglan and Tang 
Peisong. Despite the difficulties of having to endure political regime changes and war, 
the dual-identity felt by Dai, Tang, and other foreign-educated Chinese scientists enabled 
them to keep research programs going, continue to educate students, and develop 
practical solutions to China’s agricultural problems.  
 
Establishment	of	the	Tsinghua	IOA	
        In the early 1930s, after the political situation stabilized in North China, the KMT 
government (located in Nanjing) launched a “Rural Revival Movement” in order to 
promote agricultural production and the living standard of Chinese peasants. Considering 
its limited control over the country, the Nanjing government had to enlist support from 
people outside the KMT party. Patriotic intellectuals were the people most likely to 
support the KMT’s reforms, and therefore, agricultural education became an important 
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part of this movement. In May 1933, the KMT government set up a special “Rural 
Revival Committee” to administrate the “Rural Revival Movement”. As a response to 
this movement, in June 1933, The Ministry of Education in Nanjing issued Instruction 
Number 5825, which required Tsinghua to establish a school of agriculture in order to 
investigate important issues of agricultural production in North China and to train 
agricultural researchers.47  
        Because of the unsuccessful experience of the earlier agricultural department and 
schools, the Tsinghua University was not very enthusiastic about establishing this new 
school. The University committee believed that Tsinghua should focus on developing 
liberal arts, sciences, and engineering, rather than including too many programs. In 
addition, the Shandong University had already set up a school of agriculture in Qingdao 
with departments of agronomy, forestry, and sericulture, which seemed able to conduct 
investigation and research of agriculture in North and East China. Therefore Tsinghua 
was inclined to decline the instruction from Ministry of Education with this reason.48 
         Another problem (not as openly discussed) was about funding. The Tsinghua 
University committee was short of income at that time. Tsinghua’s financing came from 
the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (the China Foundation) 
which relied on the returning fund of the Boxer Indemnity. However, payment stopped in 
1932 and was in arrears in 1933. Tsinghua had just established a new engineering school 
with three departments at the beginning of 1932 and was not prepared for this suspension. 
Although Tsinghua finally went through this crisis with one million Chinese dollars 
(CND) in interim funds from Ministry of Finance in the nationalist government and three 
hundred thousand CND in bank loans, construction of the engineering school had been 
largely delayed and the university could hardly afford a new school. In March 1932, the 
university committee had publicly announced that faculty and students should not apply 
to establish new programs or departments.49  
                                                 
47 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-1-162, p. 1. 
48 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-1-162, pp. 2-6, and Cheng Guangsheng, p. 37. 
49 Since its establishment in 1924, the China Foundation started to manage funds returned by the 
US from the Boxer Indemnity. The Chinese central government paid the Boxer Indemnity to the 
United States government, which then allocated the surplus portion to the China Foundation. 
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        However, Wang Shijie (王世杰), the Minister of Education, implied that the 
Ministry of Education would require the China Foundation to move part of the Tsinghua 
fund to support the National Wuhan University to establish an agricultural school in 
Central China if Tsinghua refused to create a school of agriculture.50 Considering the 
possibility of a major funding reduction, the Tsinghua university committee finally 
decided to establish an agricultural research institute as a compromise so that they could 
still keep all their funds from the China Foundation. This institute was to focus on the 
most necessary and beneficial research topics for a future expanded agricultural school. 
        From December 1933 to September 1934, Mei Yiqi, president of the Tsinghua 
University, appointed three professors from the department of biology—Chen Zhen (陈
桢), Li Jidong (李继侗), and Dai Lisheng (戴立生)51—to organize the new Institute of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Then the China Foundation earmarked the fund to programs related to culture and education in 
China. Because of Luo Jialun’s efforts, the running of Tsinghua funds was moved to the China 
Foundation in 1928. Due to the worldwide economic crisis, in 1932 the Nationalist government 
could hardly pay the Boxer Indemnity to its creditor nations and had to ask for extension of the 
payment. The United States therefore diminished support to the China Foundation. As a result, 
the Tsinghua University could not receive funds from the China Foundation that year. See 
Journal of the National Tsinghua University, No. 379, March 9th, 1932 (《国立清华大学校刊》
第 379期). Also see Yang Tsui-hua, Patronage of Sciences: The China Foundation for the 
Promotion of Education and Culture, Taipei, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1991, 
pp. 61-68 (杨翠华，《中基会对科学的赞助》，台北，中央研究院近代史研究所专刊 65，
1991年, 第 61-68页) and Qiu Huafei, “China and the United States’ negotiation on extending 
payment of the Boxer Indemnity in 1933”, Archives of the Republic of China, 2005 Issue 2, pp. 
75-79 (仇华飞，“1933年中美延期偿还庚款问题之交涉”，《民国档案》2005年第 2期，第
75-79页).  
50 Cheng Guangsheng, Biography of Dai Fanglan, the Institute of Microbiology, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, 2008, p. 37. (程光胜，《戴芳澜传》，中国科学院微生物所，第 37
页。) The minister Wang Shijie (1891-1981) was a British-and-French-trained jurist and 
educationist. He had been founder and the first president of the National Wuhan University. As a 
successful politician and lawyer, he asked to inscribe on his gravestone only one title—“the 
former president of the National Wuhan University”.   
51 All the three biology professors were American-trained agricultural scientists. Chen Zhen 
(1894-1957) received a bachelor’s degree from the School of Agriculture in the University of 
Nanking before he got sponsorship from the Tsinghua College in 1919. He studied at the 
department of agronomy in Cornell University for two years; he then transferred to Columbia 
University in 1920 and studied in the group of T. H. Morgan. After returning China, Chen Zhen 
had worked at the Department of Biology in Tsinghua University for twenty-six years (1926-
1952). Li Jidong (1897-1961) majored in forestry in the University of Nanking and entered the 
school of forestry in Yale University with Tsinghua sponsorship in 1921. He was the first Chinese 
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Agriculture. The university committee set several operating principles. Firstly, 
considering the tight budget, this institute should be as frugal as possible; the university 
would only allocate an annual income of twenty thousand Chinese dollars for three years. 
Secondly, the institute should have no more than two disciplines. Thirdly, the new 
institute should take full advantage of existing researchers and equipment. And fourthly, 
leading researchers of the new institute should be Chinese scientists with substantial 
experience in independent research and with good scientific reputations internationally.52 
        At this time, Tsinghua had competition in the agricultural research and education 
areas. The University of Nanking was definitely the most outstanding in agriculture 
science. It was the first university in China to set up a school of agriculture.53 By the 
1930s, the University of Nanking (Jinda) School of Agriculture and Forestry had 
established nine departments: agronomy (chaired by Shen Zonghan, 沈宗瀚), forestry 
(chaired by Chen Rong, 陈嵘, also named Chen Zongyi, 陈宗一), botany (chaired by 
Albert Newton Steward, 史德蔚), sericulture (chaired by Qian Tianhe, 钱天鹤), 
agricultural economics (chaired by Lossing Buck, 卜凯), horticulture (chaired by Hu 
Changchi, 胡昌炽), plant pathology (chaired by Dai Fanglan, 戴芳澜), agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
scientist to receive a doctoral degree in forestry in the United States. Dai Lisheng (1898-1968) 
received a doctoral degree from the Stanford University and had been the founder of vertebrate 
zoology in China.  
52 For preparation and establishment of this institute, see Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-
1-200. 
53 In 1913 and 1914, Joseph Bailie, a mathematics professor in University of Nanking, started the 
departments of agriculture and forestry. In fall 1914, John H. Reisner joined the department of 
agriculture after receiving his master’s degree from Cornell University (Reisner was the only 
person in China who had a master’s degree in agriculture at that time). In 1916, the university 
committee decided to expand the department of agriculture and forestry into a school.  Randall E. 
Stross explores the history of the agricultural school in University of Nanking. See Stross, The 
Stubborn Earth: American Agriculturalists on Chinese Soil, 1898-1937, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988. Shen Zonghan (沈宗瀚) also recalls the cooperative Nanking-Cornell 
cooperative project in his memoirs. See Shen Zonghan, Autobiography of Shen Zonghan: 
Memoirs of the Middle Age, Taipei: Zhuan Ji Wen Xue Chu Ban She, 1975 (沈宗瀚，《沈宗瀚
自述：中年自述》，台北：传记文学出版社，1975). In some cases, Peking University also 
claims to be the first Chinese university setting agriculture department. However, although it had 
started a department of agriculture in 1905, President Cai Yuanpei separated it into an 
independent college in 1917 so that Peking University could concentrate on liberal arts and 
sciences.  
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education (chaired by Zhang Zhiwen, 章之汶), and a group engaged in agricultural 
science popularization.54 All the leading agricultural scientists in Jinda were American 
specialists or American-trained Chinese scientists. In addition, Jinda and Cornell 
University had developed a fraternal relationship since 1923. Several Cornell professors 
spent sabbaticals at Nanking. Two experts in plant breeding, Harry H. Love and Clyder 
Myers, arranged long-term cooperation with the University of Nanking and conducted 
their research in China for over five years.55 Strong research teams and sufficient funding 
from American missionary organizations made the School of Agriculture in Jinda 
unrivalled in contemporary China.  
        Also, in Nanjing, Guo Bingwen (郭秉文, 1880-1969),56 an American-trained 
Chinese educator, started a school of agriculture in the Southeast University, which was 
later reformed into the National Central University in 1928. Because of Gou Bingwen, 
this school gained sponsorship from the local government, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
and the China Foundation. It had six programs: agronomy, horticulture, husbandry, 
sericulture, biology, and plant pathology.57 However, except for Shen Zonghan’s plant 
breeding studies in Jinda, most agricultural research in Nanjing was based on the natural 
conditions in East China, which were quite different from those in North China (where 
Tsinghua was located). 
        In South China, the School of Agriculture in Lingnan University, another famous 
missionary university in Guangzhou, had four departments: agronomy, horticulture, 
husbandry, and sericulture. This school put particular emphasis on sericulture because 
                                                 
54 The Centennial Records of Nanking University:Historical Materials of the University of 
Nanking, pp. 253-256. 
55 See The Stubborn Earth and Autobiography of Shen Zonghan. 
56 Guo Bingwen was an American-trained Chinese educationalist. He received an Ed. D. degree 
from Columbia University in 1914 and then returned to China. In 1921, Guo Bingwen reformed 
the Nanjing Advanced Normal College into the National Southeast University, and managing this 
university by reference to the model of Harvard University and Columbia University.  
57 “Statistics of the Programs in Each School, 1933”, The Centennial Records of Nanking 
University: Historical Materials of the National Central University, p. 313. 
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silk production was a mainstay of industry in Guangdong Province.58 National Sun Yat-
Sen University’s agriculture school emphasized rice breeding as well as economic plants 
research in south China.59 Since the cooperative agricultural program of Tsinghua and 
Yenching University terminated in 1930, by 1933 the only comprehensive university in 
North China with agricultural school was the National Shandong University, which 
concentrated on forestry and sericulture.  
        Considering the specialties of other universities and the principles suggested by the 
Tsinghua university committee (as mentioned above), the three organizers decided to set 
plant pathology and entomology as major disciplines for the new agricultural institute. T 
hese foci might avoid redundant scientific construction in North China and set up 
Tsinghua’s own advantage in competition with other agricultural programs, especially the 
ones in the National Shandong University. Meanwhile, it was possible for Tsinghua to 
invite agricultural experts from other universities to join the new agricultural institute. 
        In March 1934, Dai Lisheng, Chen Zhen, and Li Jidong reported to President Mei 
Yiqi their suggestions on the new institute. This institute would be named as the Institute 
of Agriculture in Tsinghua University (清华大学农业研究所, Tsinghua IOA) and would 
include two independent research groups: the Division of Pathology, and the Division of 
Entomology. Each group would engage one professor, one or two research assistants, and 
several staff members. Tsinghua University provided 10, 000 Chinese dollars (CND) as 
starting funds to purchase equipment. In the following three years, the institute could 
receive 20, 000 CND every year,60 with 11, 600 CND as salary, 6, 400 CND for 
academic publications, and 2, 000 for research trips. The three biology professors also 
listed five scientists as professor candidates: Dai Fanglan (戴芳澜, one of the two 
                                                 
58 Chen Guojin and Yuan Zheng, Momentary Splendor: Sixty-four years of Lingnan University, 
Guangdong Renmin Press, 2008, pp. 50-51 &  83-84 (陈国钦，袁征，《瞬逝的辉煌：岭南大
学六十四年》，广东人民出版社，2008，页 50-51,83-84). Also see Yang Tsuihua, p. 155.  
59 Yang Tsuihua, pp. 153-156. 
60 Tsinghua’s annual expenditure for the entire university in the early 1930s was 1,200,000 CND. 
See Mei Yiqi, “General Report of Tsinghua’s University Affairs during the Past Year”, in 
Historical Materials of Tsinghua University, volume 2, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1990, 
pp. 21-39. Originally published in Qinghua Fu Kan, volume 39, No. 7, April 29, 1933.  
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scientists featured above), Deng Shuqun (邓叔群),61 and Tu Zhi (涂治)62 for pathology; 
Yang Weiyi (杨惟义)63 and Liu Chongle (刘崇乐) for entomology. Four of the five 
candidates—Dai Fanglan, Deng Shuqun, Tu Zhi, and Liu Chongle—were Tsinghua 
College alumni and had received postgraduate degrees in American Universities with the 
aid of Tsinghua (Boxer) scholarships. Finally, Tsinghua decided to invite Dai Fanglan 
and Liu Chongle to join this institute.64           
        When receiving invitations from Tsinghua, both Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle were 
willing to join the institute in their Alma Mater. However, both of them had already 
planned research trips to the United States. Bernard O. Dodge65 had already arranged a 
two-year visiting research trip to the New York Botanical Garden for Dai Fanglan and the 
China Foundation had awarded a grant of 7, 500 CND per year to support this research 
trip. Liu Chongle also applied for support from the China Foundation in 1934 and 
                                                 
61 Deng Shuqun (1902-1970), was a scientist of mycology, plant pathology, and forestry. He 
started the studies of forests in Northwest China and higher fungi in China. Deng Shuqun 
graduated from the Tsinghua College in 1923 and finished his studies at the agricultural school at 
Cornell University in 1928 (double majoring in forestry and plant pathology). After returning 
China, he had worked at Lingnan University, Jinda, the National Central University, and the 
Academia Sinica. He was elected as the Academia Sinica academician in 1948 and CAS 
academician in 1955. His younger brother Deng Tuo (邓拓) was a famous CCP journalist and one 
of the first intellectuals sacrificed in the Cultural Revolution. Deng Shuqun was persecuted to 
death in 1970.  
62 Tu Zhi (1901-1976) graduated from Tsinghua in 1924 and received his doctoral degree in plant 
pathology from the University of Minnesota in 1929. From 1929 to 1938, Tu Zhi worked at 
Lingnan Unviersity, Sun Yat-sen University, Wuhan University and Henan University as 
professor. He supported Marxism and the CCP and had been imprisoned by the nationalist 
government for this reason. During the war, Tu Zhi took the position of president of the 
Northwestern Agricultural School and explored agriculture, forestry and graziery in Xinjiang. 
After 1950, he took charge of translating foreign agricultural publications from English, French, 
German, and Russian into Chinese. Tu Zhi was selected as CAS academician in 1955. 
63 Yang Weiyi (1897-1972) was a European-trained entomologist. He had been the first scientist 
to work on Hemiptera in China and the first to provide a systematic way to describe the regional 
distribution of insects in China. 
64 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-200, pp. 6-10. 
65 It seems that Dai Fanglan had been deeply influenced by Dodge in his fungi studies. According 
to the memoirs of Shen Shanjiong, a younger scientist at Tsinghua IOA, Dai Fanglan had 
recommended his students interested in microbial genetics to read Dodge and Carl C. Lindegren’s 
works on Neurospora. See Shen Shanjiong, “Opportunities: Memoirs of Shen Shanjion”, in 
Memoirs of Prominent Academicians, edited by Han Cunzhi, volume 1, Shanghai: Shanghai 
Science Technology and Education Press, 2003, p. 388. (沈善炯，“机遇”，《资深院士回忆
录》，韩存志主编，第一卷，上海：上海科技教育出版社，2003年，第 388页).  
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planned research travel through the United States and Europe between October 1934 and 
April 1936.  
        In July 1934, Tsinghua reached an agreement with the two professors: Dai Fanglan 
and Liu Chongle accepted their appointments and abbreviated their research trips to one 
year. Tsinghua would count their absences as sabbatical. During the 1934-1935 academic 
year, research assistants in the two groups would undertake some surveys and make 
preparation for research under the two professors. Li Jidong from the department of 
biology would provide advice for the assistants when necessary. After returning to 
Tsinghua, Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle were expected to focus on research and 
popularization of agricultural sciences rather than teaching. Tsinghua attempted to 
appoint Dai Fanglan as the chair of the Tsinghua IOA. However, Dai Fanglan had little 
interest in taking administrative positions all through his life66 and declined determinedly. 
Liu Chongle was even more indifferent to this position. Therefore, the Tsinghua IOA at 
this time had two independent divisions but no chief leader.67 Despite this peculiar 
formation, Dai Fanlan and Liu Chongle maintained their two research groups through the 
                                                 
66 I would like to say: Dai Fanglan’s indifferent attitude triggered some troubles later. In 1949, the 
CCP government required agricultural schools in Tsinghua and Peking University to integrate 
with the agricultural division from the North China University to establish the Beijing 
Agricultural University (BAU). Again, Dai Fanglan firmly refused to be president of the BAU. 
However, he was the only person acceptable for scientists from both Tsinghua and Peking 
University. As a result, no scientist could take this position, and Le Tianyu (乐天宇, 1901-1984), 
a USSR-trained communist agriculturalist, actually started to take charge of the BAU. Le Tianyu 
insisted on replacing American sciences with Lysenkoism, which resulted in severe conflicts 
among faculty members and finally caused reorganization of the BAU and some American-
trained scientists’ leaving. Conflicts at the BAU remind me of another institute: Shanghai 
Institute of Biochemistry in Chinese Academy of Sciences. In the 1950s and 1960s, CCP also 
attempted to reform western-trained scientists in this institute. Fortunately, Wang Yinglai (王应
睐, 1907-2001), chair of the institute and a British-trained biochemist, negotiated and 
compromised with the CCP and pacified the western-trained scientists. The Institute of 
Biochemistry survived plenty of political movements without severe destruction. It even won 
fame as the “Little Cambridge” during the Cultural Revolution. For scientists and scientific 
organization in a turbulent era, sometimes it was very significant to be tactful. However, to deal 
with administrative and interpersonal affairs, scientists usually had to sacrifice their research.  
67 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 37-38. 
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remaining of their careers, even when these groups moved among many different 
research institutes.68 
        After meeting with President Mei Yiqi and other professors in July 1934, Dai 
Fanglan invited his student, Zhou Jiachi (周家炽), to be a research assistant in the 
division of plant pathology. Zhou Jiachi was Dai Fanglan’s student at the School of 
Agriculture in Jinda and had been working as a research assistant at Lingnan University 
for one year. The division of entomology invited Mao Yingdou (毛应斗), a new graduate 
from the department of biology in Yenching University, to be a lecturer. Due to the 
limited research resources, by the summer of 1935, the lecturer and research assistant 
mainly conducted surveys and collections near Peiping.  
        Besides engaging researchers, President Mei Yiqi continued negotiating with the 
Ministry of Education and the local government in Peiping for some suitable places as 
experimental fields for the Institute of Agriculture. Mei Yiqi’s original objective was the 
ruins of Yuan Ming Yuan (圆明园, the Old Summer Palace destroyed by French and 
British troops in 1860 during the Second Opium War). The Yuan Ming Yuan ruins 
covered an area of 3.5 square kilometers and it was next to the northwest corner of the 
Tsinghua campus, which was very convenient for Tsinghua IOA researchers to conduct 
field experiments. Mei Yiqi proposed his application to Minister Wang Shijie in a letter 
on July 8, 1933. However, Mei underestimated an important factor: since the destruction 
of the palace buildings in the 1860s, local peasants had gradually moved into this site for 
farming and residence, and local officials could not control them.  
                                                 
68 At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, Tsinghua had to suspend the Institute of 
Agriculture and these two divisions had to merge with the department of biology in the National 
Changsha Temporary University. In summer 1938 Tsinghua restored the Institute of Agriculture, 
so Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle returned to their original positions. In 1947 this institute was 
formed into a school of agriculture and the research groups became departments in the new 
school. In September 1949, the agricultural schools in Tsinghua and Peking University (along 
with the North China Agricultural University from communist area) integrated into the Beijing 
Agricultural University (BAU); therefore Dai and Liu’s groups joined the departments of 
pathology and entomology in BAU. In 1952 and 1953, after series of political and interpersonal 
conflicts, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) got agreements with the BAU to reorganize 
several research groups in BAU—including Dai and Liu’s groups—into CAS. Dai Fanlan and Liu 
Chongle spent the rest of their lives in CAS. Their research groups finally become the Institute of 
Microbiology and the Institute of Zoology in CAS.  
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Chaotic political circumstances since the late Qing Dynasty had created entangled 
property claims related to the Yuan Ming Yuan ruins. In the early 1930s, the Peiping 
local government was managing the property. Concerned about income, the Peiping 
government did not want to give this site to Tsinghua. It was only a few years after the 
nationalist government’s unifying China, and the Peiping government was not fully 
subordinate to the central government. As mentioned before, the central government was 
still powerless in many parts of China and was unwilling to displease the local 
government for Tsinghua’s sake. Therefore, the Ministry of Education suggested that 
Tsinghua negotiate with the Peiping local government directly. Tsinghua spent more than 
half a year and took some tactful means to solve this difficulty. For example, President 
Mei Yiqi had written several times to Shen Pengfei (沈鹏飞), an early Tsinghua School 
graduate who was working as director of the Department of Higher Education at the 
Nanjing government, to ask for help. However, the local officials were not the root of the 
problem. Peasants living on this site over decades believed that Tsinghua was looting 
their land and resolutely resisted Tsinghua’s taking over. They wrote to President Mei 
with angry questions,69 and accused Tsinghua of bullying and oppressing poor peasants at 
                                                 
69 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2-1-162, pp.66-70. This might be an interesting case. The 
original letter (as below) was written in very literary classical Chinese, with very beautiful hand 
script (the poor peasants must have some old-school intellectual to write this letter~). The general 
idea of this letter was: the noble elite Tsinghua scholars were lying to the Nanjing government; 
Tsinghua was not promoting agriculture at all, but just wanted to rob the poor peasants to take 
profits for themselves; the poor peasants could only make their lives by farming and would die if 
losing their lands, so, if they had to die, they might kill someone who had caused the misfortune 
for revenge. –It seems that the peasants were really upset and threatening President Mei and the 
Tsinghua IOA with their lives! 
“贻琦校长执事  
        农民 等僻处西郊，与贵校为比邻，唯以车笠悬殊，自惭衣冠不整，故每相逢道左，未
敢为礼。然而道貌则瞻仰有素矣。执事得英才而教育之， 农 等唯以牧我牛羊，其道不
同。至于仰事俯畜之资，均赖终岁勤动其揆一也。自维择邻于学府之侧，庶几可免豪右欺
凌，耕食鎜饮，谓余生当可苟全矣。 
        乃日前披阅报章，得读执事上南京教育部之洋洋大文，竟欲攫夺圆明园而据为己有。
年来振兴农村、救济农村之声调不绝于耳，虽则于屡遭欺骗之余，未敢遽信，但私衷窃
祷，未尝不希邀上天之眷怜，变理想而为实现也。岂图振兴者未遑，救济者有待，而新式
破坏农村之方法竟出自我芳邻之学府，泛此兵匪不得视为专业矣，蚩氓何辜遭此荼毐！ 
        执事所云：“该地久沦荒墟”，其真内情不知耶，则出入于斯者有年，乃并田腾之禾麦
蒙茸而不见，未免蹒跚可笑，其知之而故作此语，以欺蒙政府耶则其心实可诛矣！ 
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Yuan Ming Yuan to the peasants’ union of Peiping KMT party headquarters. Tsinghua’s 
higher intellectuals with an American-training background could hardly expect to be 
trusted by the poor Chinese peasants. As a result, Tsinghua IOA thus never used this 
convenient land during its entire existence from 1934 to 1947. Moreover, the Tsinghua 
officials learned to carefully consider the desires of the local people.70  
        The episode of the Yuan Ming Yuan land, along with some later conflicts between 
the Tsinghua IOA and local peasants in Peiping or southwest China, suggested an 
unpleasant fact of most American-trained Chinese agricultural scientists: no matter how 
“Chinese” they considered themselves and how enthusiastic they were to serve China, 
their identity as “American-trained scientists” determined that poor Chinese peasants 
would consider them as outsiders and were inclined to keep distance from them. 
Although these scientists were able to fluently communicate with high politicians and 
famous international scientists, most (not all) of them lacked the skill to closely 
communicate with and gain the trust from low-class peasants, who were directly working 
on agricultural production in China. This character implied that these scientists often 
were not able to directly apply their knowledge and had to cooperate with the 
governments or other agricultural activists. 
        When Dai Fanglan returned from his sabbatical in August 1935, Tsinghua IOA still 
had no experimental fields. Researchers borrowed three rooms from the department of 
biology as laboratory—one bigger room for the division of entomology and two smaller 
                                                                                                                                                 
        今以一语告执事：耕者藉地以为活，失地则无以自存，牛衣对泣，冻馁而死。死也自
杀死也，杀人而自偿之亦死也，冤各有头债各有主，若相煎迫而至山穷水尽时，则吾侪亦
知所以自处矣嗟乎！ 
        执事庚款期限尚能得几年？贵校所积之基金，果真有余力以经营此万数千亩之农场
乎？其谁欺？若自以为奥援可恃，不惜先破坏一大好农村，以留待后日之试验，自非丧心
病狂当不出此是！则执事此举，其非为公也明矣。既非为公，自当别有所为，勿以为一手
竟可掩尽天下目也！ 
        且近顷贵校以兴办农场为由，已向实业部索得香山迤南松堂之地千余亩，未见经营之
迹，而又汲汲欲攫夺圆明园。试问执事之学校究竟须要若干农场而后可？天下事不平则
鸣，激且生变，解铃系铃莫能相代，唯执事实图之。 
        情急陈词，不知所择，肃此上达即颂台祺 
圆明园全体佃户谨启 通讯处  
圆明园前湖三十二号于珠轩” 
70 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-162-1.  
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Figure 6.  In 1934, Tsinghua scientists attempted to rent former government lands for research 
station. Unfortunately, peasants already lived there under rental agreements with the 
previous governments. This photo shows the first page of a letter from some Yuan Ming Yuan 
peasants to President Mei Yiqi in 1934. The original letter was written in very literary classical 
Chinese, with very beautiful hand script (the poor peasants must have had some old‐school 
intellectual to write this letter!). The general idea of this letter was: the noble elite Tsinghua 
scholars were lying to the Nanjing government; Tsinghua was not promoting agriculture at all, 
but just wanted to rob the poor peasants to take profits for themselves; the poor peasants 
could only make their living by farming and would die if losing their lands, so, if they had to 
die, they might kill someone who had caused the misfortune for revenge. This is an example 
of how difficult it was for the scientists to find research facilities in such chaotic times (and 
this was the so‐called “golden age”!). (Tsinghua University Archives, file 1‐2‐1‐162, p. 66) 
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rooms for the division of plant pathology. At the request of Dai Fanglan, Tsinghua gave 
the IOA 0.06 square kilometers of land on campus for research. As for equipment, 
Tsinghua IOA managed to borrow books and laboratory supplies from other biological 
institutes such as the department of biology in Tsinghua and the Fan Memorial Institute 
of Biology. But they had to subscribe to agricultural journals themselves, and 6400 CND 
per year was far away from enough. Generally speaking, Tsinghua IOA started its 
research program under very limited conditions.71 
        From 1934 to the summer of 1937, research by the Tsinghua IOA staff was 
generally based on the North China area and its particular agricultural problems. The 
Division of Entomology conducted surveys on insect pests, beneficial insect breeding, 
and life history of insects. It also collaborated with the department of chemistry for 
insecticide research. In addition to Mao Yingdou, this division engaged Zhu Bao (朱宝, 
later changed his name into Zhu Hongfu 朱弘复 in December 1939) and Fan Xinrun (范
新润) as research assistants in 1935 and Guo Haifeng (郭海峰) in 1936. All the three 
research assistants were Tsinghua graduates—Zhu Hongfu (1910-2002) and Guo Haifeng 
from the department of biology while Fan Xinrun was from the department of chemistry. 
The division of entomology published thirteen academic articles and some scientific 
popular pamphlets (such as An Elementary Introduction to Insects, 《昆虫浅说》, see 
Figure 7.) during the prewar period. Scientists at the division of plant pathology 
conducted surveys on plant diseases and fungi in North China. Zhou Jiachi cooperated 
with Professor Li Jidong at the department of biology and kept contact with Qiu Weifan 
and Wei Jingchao at Jinda for his survey research when Dai Fanglan was in the U.S. 
After Dai Fanglan returned, this division increased with two research assistants—Shi Lei 
(石磊) and Wang Qinghe (王清和). Dai Fanglan led and instructed these younger  
                                                 
71 Yan Wanying, “The Institute of Agriculture in Tsinghua University during Wartime”, in 
Tsinghua University and Science and Technology in modern China, edited by Yang Jian and Dai 
Wusan, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2006, pp. 211-222.  Originally published on 
Historical Materials of Chinese Science and Technology, No. 4, 1987. (闫万英，“抗战时期的清
华大学农业研究所”，《清华大学与中国近现代科学技术》，杨舰，戴吾三编著，北京：
清华大学出版社，2006年，页 211-222。原载《中国科技史料》1987年第四期). 
  48 
 
Figure 7. This is the cover page of the first volume of Brief Introduction of Insects (Kunchong 
Qian Shuo, 《昆虫浅说》), a four‐volume serial popular science booklet published by the 
Division of Entomology at Tsinghua IOA in 1935, aiming to introduce important pests and 
beneficial insects in North China to local peasants. These publications included the basic 
biology of the insects, including life cycles, and were intended to be educational. (Tsinghua 
University archives, file 1‐2‐1‐200, p. 29)
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Figure 8. Scientists of the Tsinghua IOA. Taken in 1937, Peiping. (Tsinghua Annual Journal, 
1937)  
(The original photo was marked as “the Division of Plant Pathology at Tsinghua IOA”. However, 
I can recognize Liu Chongle and Mao Yingdou from the division of entomology. It should be a 
photo of the entire institute at that time.) 
 
scientists to identify pathogens of diseases of millets, white pear, sorghum, wheat, and 
barley, which were crops and fruits widely planted in North China at that time. 
Meanwhile, they continued a fungi taxonomy project that Dai Fanglan had started at 
Jinda by collecting and identifying fungi in North China.72 
        In this way, Tsinghua IOA started its works with American-trained scientists who 
had to negotiate between the central government and local conditions. (See Figure 8.) 
They quickly adapted their research projects to the local fungi, insects, crops, and fruits. 
They were good at working with limited research resources. Compared with its rivals in 
Nanjing (such as the agricultural programs at the University of Nanking or the National 
Central University), the Tsinghua IOA received less governmental interference and the 
faculty had a fair amount of autonomy in designing their research and education. 
Although this was a new agricultural institute in the mid-1930s, it was positioned to 
succeed over the next twenty years because of the strong academic background support 
from Tsinghua and its politically marginal location among Chinese universities, which 
                                                 
72 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-200, pp. 17-26. 
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allowed it to be flexible and able to thrive in chaotic circumstances and adapt to local 
conditions. 
Moving	to	the	Southwest	
        The ability to be flexible and adaptive proved very important when the Second Sino-
Japanese War broke out in July 1937. It seemed that the Institute of Agriculture in 
Tsinghua University faced an unfortunate fate to be terminated. The Japanese Army 
quickly occupied the campuses of several leading universities in North China, such as the 
National Peking University (PKU) and Tsinghua University, as well as Nankai 
University. On August 28, 1937, the Ministry of Education instructed the three 
presidents—Mei Yiqi of Tsinghua, Jiang Menglin of Peking University, and Zhang 
Boling of Nankai University—to arrange a retreat to Changsha, Hunan province, in order 
to unite together and to continue education and research in exile during the war. On 
September 10, the Ministry of Education’s No. 16696 Instruction joined the three 
universities and established the National Changsha Temporary University. The university 
officially opened on November 1, 1937. However, the war went much worse than 
Chinese people’s expectations. Shanghai and Nanjing fell into the hands of the Japanese 
army in November and December. Wuhan and Changsha in Central China quickly 
became the front. From February to April 1938, the Changsha Temporary University had 
to move once again to Kuming and was renamed as the National Southwest Associated 
University (国立西南联合大学，abbreviated as “Lianda”).73 (See Figure 3, the map of 
Tsinghua’s movements.) 
        Tsinghua IOA was not totally unready for the retreat. Already when Japan plotted to 
create a separate puppet regime in North China in autumn 1935, the Tsinghua University 
had realized the danger and started to purchase land and buildings in Changsha to prepare 
for the retreat. In summer 1936, the Tsinghua IOA started a cooperative program with the 
Hunan Provincial Advanced Agricultural Professional School in Changsha in order to 
transfer its research focus to Central China.74  Nevertheless, no one had expected that the 
                                                 
73 See John Israel, Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution. 
74 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-2:1-201.  
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war would come so rapidly or that the nationalist army would be overpowered. Tsinghua 
IOA had to leave Peiping so hastily that they could neither harvest their plants nor rescue 
their research materials. Although a German company later helped the scientists move 
some equipment to Kunming, they had lost all the books and journals, research data, 
specimens, and seeds. On January 19, 1938, the Tsinghua university committee felt that it 
had no choice but to eliminate the Tsinghua IOA and to amalgamate it with the 
department of biology in Lianda.75  
        The retreat and unification of the three universities from North China is a good 
example to show the ongoing tension between the central and provincial governments. 
The KMT central government was more willing to support universities from Nanjing and 
east China, the base area of its government. Although it continued supporting the three 
universities from North China, annual appropriations for these universities were reduced 
to 75% of that before the war. In addition, when the central government allocated extra 
money to universities, Lianda only counted as one unit even though it was composed of 
three universities, while the National Central University from Nanjing maintained its 
independence and counted as one unit as well. The actual result was that Tsinghua, PKU, 
and Nankai could receive less support from the KMT central government compared with 
their rivals from the base area of the KMT government.  
        On the other hand, some provincial governments were very passionate in inviting 
these northern universities to relocate to their area. Before the war, the Hunan provincial 
government started cooperation with Tsinghua in agricultural experiments and education, 
and assigned lands and constructions for Tsinghua in 1935. When the Changsha 
Temporary University planned to move to the southwest, it received enthusiastic 
invitations from both Yunnan and Guangxi provincial presidents. The university leaders 
finally decided to move to Yunnan because it seemed farther from the battlefront and 
safer at that time, but the Guangxi government was so zealous that the universities had to 
send several very famous professors there to express their denial gracefully. All these 
provinces were still influenced by political and military forces that disagreed with the 
KMT government. They were all underdeveloped and poorly civilized before the war and 
                                                 
75 Tsinghua University Archives, file 1-3:3-40, p. 2. 
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their governors believed that the top universities from north China could help them to 
develop both education and economics. Tsinghua found a balance between these political 
forces and got the chance to survive and thrive in the chaotic environment. 
 
Growth	in	Marginal	Regions	
        After arriving in Kunming, the southwest provincial capital city, the situation 
changed. During the war, all major agricultural and industrial producing areas fell into 
the hands of Japan. The nationalist government had to depend on its unoccupied regions 
including southwest China to support the country and to fight against the Japanese. 
During the war, the areas formally controlled by the KMT government included Sichuan, 
Yunan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and parts of Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, and Zhejiang provinces. The 
southeast provinces were front lines to fight with the Japanese, and Shaanxi and Shanxi 
were interspersed by base areas of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Therefore, the 
nationalist central government could only effectively practice reforms in the Southwest to 
improve agricultural production. At a temporary national party congress in March 1938, 
the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) passed the Wartime Principles for State 
Establishing (《战时建国纲领》), which stressed that agriculture should have 
precedence over other industry and transportation. In April 1939, the KMT launched its 
first national production conference to make a comprehensive plan for agricultural 
improvement. This conference outlined several essential points for wartime agricultural 
development, including improving food production to support people’s life, providing 
raw materials for industrial production, and increasing exportation of economic 
agricultural products.76  
        The Southwest had been an extremely backward region in China until that time. 
Even the most productive province, Sichuan, needed to import rice every year in the 
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1930s. Before the war, cotton production in the Southwest only counted for 4% of the 
national production. Thus the challenge to advancing science and technology to elevate 
agricultural production in this region was significant. The Central Agricultural 
Experimental Institute (中央农业实验所, CAEI) took charge of agricultural research in 
academic organizations and popularization of advanced agricultural knowledge and 
techniques. On one hand, the CAEI operated financial and scientific aids to research 
institutes in the Academia Sinica (the National Central Academy) and chief universities 
for research in improving agricultural production. On the other hand, the CAEI 
functioned as a governmental branch to help each county establish a department of 
agricultural popularization and more agricultural clubs in villages in order to pass 
agricultural knowledge and techniques to local peasants directly.77 Shen Zonghan, chair 
of the CAEI, therefore decided to sponsor research at the Tsinghua IOA, where his old 
Jinda colleagues and Cornell alumni Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle were engaged. 
        Given this situation, Tsinghua University was willing to restore and expand the IOA 
as well, for the sake of both the country and the university itself. According to Tang 
Peisong’s memoirs, all the three universities—Tsinghua, Peking University, and 
Nankai—believed that the association of Lianda was merely an expedient measure and 
that they would definitely separate after the war. Therefore, all the three were willing to 
conserve forces for postwar development.78 After Shanghai, where the main office of 
China Foundation was located, fell into the hands of Japan, Tsinghua could not get its 
monthly funds any more. The central government’s fund for Lianda was 75% of the total 
of the three universities’ prewar funds, which, considering skyrocketing prices during the 
war, was clearly not enough for further development. Therefore, Tsinghua decided to 
request a loan from banks with its temporarily unavailable China Foundation fund as 
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guarantee. The loan allowed Tsinghua to establish and expand several research institutes 
independent from Lianda. In June 1938, the Institute of Agriculture was restored and 
expanded in Kunming. Meanwhile, Tsinghua established the Institute of Radio Science, 
the Institute of Metallurgy, the Institute of Aeronautics, and the Institute of National 
Condition Survey. Ye Qisun (叶企孙) was appointed as chairman of these special 
institutes.79  
        The two prewar divisions got the opportunity to recruit new researchers with 
American postgraduate training backgrounds. Yu Dafu (俞大绂) and Lu Jinren (陆近仁) 
joined the divisions of pathology and entomology as associate professors respectively in 
July and October 1938. In addition, the Tsinghua IOA established a new division, 
Laboratory of Physiology, which later became the most active one. The new division was 
chaired by Tang Peisong (汤佩松), whom we met earlier. Yin Hongzhang, who had 
already been engaged with the department of biology in Lianda, also started to work at 
Tang Peisong’s group as an honorary fellow. Zhang Xincheng, Tang Peisong’s student 
and colleague at Wuhan University, joined the physiology group as an associate professor 
in May 1939. In summer 1939, Lou Chenghou (娄成后, 1911-2009), Tang Peisong’s 
Tsinghua junior and University of Minnesota alumnus, returned from Minnesota after 
receiving his Ph.D. degree and joined Tang’s group with latest instruments for 
electrophysiology purchased from the United States. Therefore, Tang Peisong’s group 
became the best equipped plant physiology laboratory in southwest China.80 
        Although Tsinghua IOA had three groups, its formation and operation became a 
problem again. Again, both Dai Fanglan and Liu Chongle were totally indifferent to 
being head of this institute. Tang Peisong was very interested in such managerial job, but 
as a newcomer and the youngest professor, it was inappropriate for him to take this 
position. Therefore the Tsinghua IOA stayed in three independent groups without an 
institute head.  
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        Through early 1939, the Tsinghua IOA stayed together with Lianda at some 
temporary campus buildings in Kunming. However, after September 1939, the Japanese 
air force started to bomb Kunming. Air attacks became more and more frequent once 
Japanese troops occupied Hanoi, Vietnam in 1940. Many temporary classrooms and 
laboratories were ruined in the air attacks. The city was not a safe place any more. The 
Tsinghua university committee decided to rent lands in rural areas near Kunming and 
move the special institutes out of town to avoid air attacks. From January to September, 
1939, Mei Yiqi and Ye Qisun contacted the Department of Construction of Yunnan 
Province and signed a ten-year lease to rent a land of 165.87 mu (0.11 square kilometers) 
at Dapuji (大普吉), northwestern suburb of Kunming. From the end of 1939 to the 
summer 1946, Dapuji was the base for the divisions of pathology and physiology of 
Tsinghua IOA, as well as the base for the Institute of Radio Science and the Institute of 
Metallurgy. The division of entomology set an office in Kunming and rented a land of ten 
mu at Poxi (婆兮), a small town 170 kilometers south of Kunming, as their experimental 
farm to plant fruit-trees and sugarcane (important crops of the southwest).81 
        Living conditions at these villages were extremely tough. These prominent scientists 
had to build up houses as well as establish basic water and power systems for their lives 
and research. They also needed to deal with harassment from brigands, local peasants, 
and the soldiers protecting them.82 By 1939, the annual fund from Tsinghua for each 
research group had increased to 30,000 CND. In addition, the divisions of plant 
pathology and entomology received 8,000 CND annual stipend from CAEI; the group of 
general physiology had a grant of US $2,500 from the Rockefeller Foundation.83 
Although the funding had increased, the scientists had to repurchase apparatus and 
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journals, and, different from in Peiping, there were few other research organizations in 
Kunming to share research equipment with Tsinghua IOA. The financial situation for the 
Tsinghua IOA became even tougher after 1940, when severe inflation happened in 
Southwest China.  
        However, in the villages the scientists were finally able to stay far away from air 
attacks and to settle down for their research and education. Since the summer of 1939, 
when Lianda restarted to recruit graduate students, Tsinghua IOA had accepted many 
graduate students from the departments of biology and chemistry as research assistants. It 
provided a relatively peaceful environment for graduate students to conduct experimental 
research and finish their studies at the master’s level. Also after 1939, Lianda restarted 
the exams to select talented Chinese students to study in the U.S. The Tsinghua IOA 
functioned as a preparatory training institute and allowed the selected biology and 
agriculture students to undertake short-term research before going to the U.S.84  
        Because all professors at Tsinghua IOA were American-trained scientists and 
familiar with English and American culture, they played an important role in receiving 
western scientists. After 1941, when the United States joined the Allies of WWII, China 
restored its diplomatic communication with the U.S. and Britain. Academic 
communications became active as well.85 Tsinghua IOA scientists’ contribution to the 
local-global circulation of scientific knowledge lasted till the 1970s and 1980s, which I 
will explore in the following parts. 
 
Reforms	and	Finality		
        After the Sino-Japanese War, the Tsinghua IOA returned to Peiping in 1946. It was 
reorganized into the School of Agriculture in 1947, with Tang Peisong as the director. 
Several professors (such as Yin Hongzhang and Yu Dafu) left for foreign organizations 
or Peking University, but the three leading scientists stayed in the new agricultural 
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school. The divisions of plant pathology and entomology were reformed into the 
departments of plant pathology and entomology. The Laboratory of General Physiology 
was changed into the department of agricultural chemistry. Tang Peisong borrowed the 
institutional model of Johns Hopkins University and aimed to establish the agricultural 
school at Tsinghua as an institute training elite scientists. For instance, there were in total 
12 professors, all of whom were western-trained scientists with teaching experience, in 
the three departments. And in 1947 this school enrolled only 12 students. Tang Peisong 
wished to maintain the faculty/students ratio around 1:5 after five years. He got 
permission to use an area86 near the Summer Palace as site for the agricultural school. In 
addition, he purchased and installed most advanced apparatus for field works and 
laboratory research.87 
        However, the turbulent political environment broke Tang Peisong’s dream of 
building a Johns Hopkins University in China. In the middle of December 1948, the PLA 
troops (People’s Liberation Army, the army of the CCP) besieged Peiping. President Mei 
Yiqi fled to Nanjing. All Tsinghua professors gathered together to discuss the future of 
their university. Tang Peisong was the first one to stand up and appeal that “Tsinghua 
was built up with the blood of Chinese people. Now it is time to give it back to the 
people!”88 His appeal received a thunder of applause. Most Tsinghua faculty and students 
had no affection for the nationalist government. They took a university-wide vote and 
decided to accept liberation of the CCP. The discussion and voting exemplified Tsinghua 
scientists’ identity of “being Chinese” and their “love for China” which motivated them 
to make this important decision. Their primary allegiance was not to the central 
government, but to the Chinese people.  
        Nine months later, under an instruction from the CCP central government, the 
Tsinghua agricultural school was integrated into the new Beijing Agricultural University 
(BAU) along with the Peking University agricultural school and an agricultural division 
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from the North China University. Scientists from the Tsinghua IOA reunited at the BAU, 
and the Tsinghua IOA itself had finally ended up in this new specialized agricultural 
university. 
V.	From	the	Local	to	the	Global—Case	Studies	of	the	Tsinghua	
Scientists	Negotiating	the	Basic	Science	–	Applied	Science	
Boundary	
        During its early development, Tsinghua was established as a preparatory school for 
the Boxer students. It had been highly inclined to prepare students for practical studies 
because according to the agreement between the US and the Chinese government, more 
than 80% of the Boxer students must major in practical knowledge such as science, 
engineer, medicine, and agriculture. The primary goal for training western-style 
intellectuals was to introduce practical knowledge directly beneficial for China. In 
addition, China was so underdeveloped in both economics and scientific institution, and 
therefore not able to support pure scientific research without obvious use. It was very 
hard for Chinese scientists to have equal academic communication with their foreign 
colleagues. Since the late 1920s, however, scientific research and education institutions 
had greatly improved in many areas of China, as mentioned above. It was no longer an 
extravagant hope for the Chinese people to create international-level scientific knowledge 
at their home country. At this time, Tsinghua had evolved to a leading university in 
China, which meant that it needed to maintain both its teaching and research at a high 
level. On one hand, Yu Zhenyong’s unsuccessful agricultural department suggested that 
simply applying agricultural knowledge and directly teaching the peasants was not 
enough for the development of agricultural department in a leading Chinese university. 
On the other hand, pure research without application was definitely unsuitable for the 
actual conditions of the Republican China, because most parts of the country was still 
very poor and the country could not afford huge investment in scientific research without 
noticeable reward. Therefore, it was the time for Chinese scientists to re-evaluate the 
importance of pure and applied sciences in order to make a long-term development plan. 
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        I argue here that the Tsinghua IOA scientists found a way to emphasize both pure 
research and application, which allowed them to be able to adapt to local conditions and 
to communicate with their international scientific colleagues. Dai Fanglan had pointed 
out at the very beginning of Tsinghua IOA’s establishment that: 
        “[O]ur institute will devote our research to resolving practical problems 
in agricultural production. We are not focusing on profound research. This is 
why we name us as the Institute of Agriculture (农业研究所) rather than 
institute of agricultural sciences (农学研究所).”89 
And that:  
        “All applied sciences are built up on the base of pure research.”90     
        These paradoxical expressions do not imply an inconsistency among the Tsinghua 
IOA scientists. Actually, historians of science in modern China have already noticed that 
pure and applied sciences in China have not been in a tension as they had in the United 
States.91 Although debates around the relationship between pure and applied sciences had 
lasted through the republican period in mainland China, generally speaking, Chinese 
scholars in the 1920s and the 1930s believed that the two were inseparable and deserved 
equal attention and investment. For example, in 1936, Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培) proposed 
that: 
         “Scientific research should not set application as the only purpose. Many 
applicable scientific results were achieved as the byproduct of pure scientific 
research. … It is undeniable that achievements of pure sciences may become 
foundations of applied sciences, while concerns of applied sciences can 
provide new topics and methodologies for pure sciences. We should place 
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equal emphasis on both of them and therefore receive double-wins. Ignoring 
one of the two would result in failure for both of them.”92 
        Scientists such as Ding Wenjiang and Tao Menghe also declared that the so-called 
“pure” or “applied” sciences were just simple and convenient categories to distinguish 
some new disciplines, while science itself should be a cohesive entirety rather than 
separate fragments. “It should be called the application of sciences, rather than applied 
sciences.”93 
        Therefore, although Chinese scientists motivated by their identity of being Chinese 
were inclined to conduct the scientific research most useful and practical for China’s 
prosperity and strength, they were able to stress the identity of being scientists and 
therefore were able to balance pure research and applications in their results. The reason 
for the successful balance was that, although the government and people in China—just 
as in the U.S.—were demanding that scientists produce most beneficial outcomes, 
Chinese scientists felt that it was critical to contribute to international scientific research, 
because science in China had been dominated by foreigners. With pride in being Chinese 
scientists, they wanted to create and circulate new scientific knowledge around the world 
in order to promote China’s status in the global scientific community as well as to 
promote the development of science. As examples of this strategy, I will briefly discuss 
Tsinghua scientists’ work in three areas: the biological control of insects, water potential 
in plant respiration, and fungal classification. 
Biological	Control	of	Pest	Insects	
        Compared with Dai Fanglan and Tang Peisong, Liu Chongle, director of the 
Division of Entomology at Tsinghua IOA, seemed to be quieter and less public. 
However, his experience in Republican China might be the best example of how 
scientific knowledge circulated between China and the West.  
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        Liu was born in Shanghai on September 20, 1901. His grandfather Liu Qixian (刘齐
衔, 1815-1877), the son-in-law of Lin Zexu (林则徐), had taken positions such as 
provincial governor or judge (e.g., 陕西布政使, and 浙江按察使). Liu Chongle majored 
in chemistry and biology at Tsinghua College from 1916 to 1920. He received B.S. 
degree from Cornell University in 1922 and entered the department of entomology at the 
agricultural school in this university. After receiving a doctoral degree, Liu Chongle 
returned to China in September 1926 and served as a professor at the Northeastern 
University in Shenyang. After the September 18 Incident,94 when most faculty and 
students of the Northeastern University were exiled to Peiping, Liu Chongle was engaged 
by the department of biology in the National Peiping Normal University (Beijing Normal 
University). By 1933, Liu Chongle had become the chair of this department. However, 
compared with universities with foreign supports such as Jinda and Tsinghua, the Peiping 
Normal University (funded by the Ministry of Education in Nanjing) did not have enough 
funding to effectively support scientific survey and research. Liu Chongle had not gotten 
the chance to put what he had learned from the Cornell agricultural school to good use 
until he joined Tsinghua IOA in 1934.95 
        Biological control of insect pests had been Liu Chongle’s research focus all through 
his life. During his research trip in 1934 and 1935, Liu Chongle visited six western 
institutes for this topic—the agricultural experiment station of the Hawaiian Sugar 
Planters’ Association, Honolulu, Hawaii; the Cities Experiment Station, Riverside, 
California; the Gipsy Moth Laboratory, Melrose Highlands, Massachusetts; European 
Corn Borer laboratory, Arlington, Massachusetts; Japanese Beetle Laboratory, 
Moorestown, New Jersey; and the parasite laboratory of the Imperial Bureau of 
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Entomology, Farnham Royal, England. He was deeply impressed by the use of parasitic 
wasps in controlling orange pests in California.96  
We see Liu’s strategy to link his basic science research program to local 
applications very clearly when he and his Tsinghua colleagues fled to Yunnan Province 
to escape the Japanese Army during the war. From 1936 to 1937, Liu designed and 
headed a research program in which his assistants and students identified natural enemies 
of pests of plants important to the economy in North China, including cotton, sorghum, 
and oak. After moving to Yunnan, Liu and the Tsinghua entomologists shifted their 
emphasis to pest insects of peaches, sugarcane, and some other plants that were 
economically important to this south-western province. In the southwest, they had to start 
over to figure out the life histories of local pest insects and identify some of the natural 
predatory insects of these pests through experiments. Meanwhile, the entomology group 
cooperated with the physiology group to give weekly lectures to researchers from Lianda, 
Tsinghua, and local schools and institutes. Liu Chongle was the first presenter of this 
lecture series and his topic was on a parasitic wasp of a beetle larva. Lacking the 
personnel, Tsinghua IOA by itself was not able to popularize this scientific method. 
However, Liu and his Tsinghua colleagues gave their research results to the agricultural 
departments of the provincial government for further popularization and education (a 
topic I would like to explore further in my dissertation). Because of Tsinghua IOA’s 
collaboration with these governmental organizations, the idea of biological control of 
pests was disseminated to peasants in South China and became a popular method to treat 
pests after the 1950s. Interestingly, although the idea of bio-control originated in western 
countries, it declined in the US and Europe after the wide application of chemical 
fertilizer and pesticides. As a result, when mainland China restarted diplomatic 
communications with the US, scientists from America were deeply impressed by bio-
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control of insect pest in China, and this method was re-introduced to American people as 
an example of mass science from communist China.97  
        According to the extant documents of Liu Chongle, unlike Dai Fanglan and Tang 
Peisong, Liu did not talk too much about love for his country. He was always quiet 
towards issues beyond the scope of his scientific research. Compared with the identity of 
being Chinese, the identity of being a scientist seemed to be a stronger motivation 
through Liu’s life and career. For example, Liu Chongle described the goals of Tsinghua 
IOA as: 
        “This program was established under the request of government and belongs 
to a university. … The working emphasis must be research and cultivating 
scientists. … The general steps for insect research were surveying, experimenting, 
and popularizing…”98  
And when talking about the biological control of pests, he believed that the duty of 
Tsinghua scientists was research rather than popularization and education: 
“Our research outcomes may be applied to the control and utilization of insects. 
However, our labors were too limited to popularize the outcomes among peasants. 
We need to cooperate with governmental departments for the popularization.”99 
Compared with Dai Fanglan’s description of the goals of the IOA, his words reveal that 
Liu was not as interested in institution building and especially publicity. He preferred to 
focus narrowly on his research and let the government popularize and apply his findings. 
        During the wartime, CAEI (the Central Agricultural Experimental Institute) 
provided about half of the research funding for Liu Chongle’s group, which implied that 
the central government was expecting some practical results from Liu’s research. From 
the case of Liu’s bio-control research, we can see that this scientist did not especially 
alter his research interest to fit the requirements of the government. However, one the 
other hand, we should also notice that even without the motivation of governmental 
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funding, Liu was choosing—maybe unconsciously—some research topic potentially 
beneficial for his country. During his 1934-1935 research trip, Liu wrote to president 
Mei Yiqi to introduce the bio-control method he saw in California, and expressed an 
enthusiasm to apply this method in rural China. While the idea of biological control of 
insect pests can only be applied based on specific local conditions, Liu Chongle’s 
research exemplified how a general scientific idea from western countries adapted to and 
developed in local environments, and how Chinese scientists fed the developed ideas 
back to their western colleagues. Liu also exemplified a way of Chinese scientists to 
realize their dual-identity—they claimed to be focusing on pure scientific research of 
their interest, and claimed to be indifferent in politics and practical application of 
knowledge. However, motivated by the identity of being Chinese (maybe 
unconsciously), their research interests were entangled with the actual needs of Chinese 
society. Therefore, when conducting and creating scientific knowledge, they were also 
contributing to their country and particularly to the welfare of its people. 
 
Pure	Research	of	Plant	Metabolism	
        Among the three leading Tsinghua IOA scientists, Tang Peisong had especially 
emphasized pure research while he was also a major contributor to the application of 
science. His practical research included producing lubricant oil with castor-oil plants as 
raw materials; cultivating fast-growing crops and seedless fruits by applying auxin, 
colchicine, and low-temperature treatments; researching fermentation processes and 
producing acetone and calcium lactate; and surveying nutritional details of Chinese diets 
and planning a balanced diet for Chinese soldiers. These contributions made Tang’s 
group very attractive for both young students and governmental and industrial financial 
support during the war. Tang created a very good balance between practical studies of 
applied science and the pure research of sciences with less obvious direct benefits. These 
practical studies, on one hand, realized Tang’s identity of “being for the Chinese 
people”—the desire to serve China; on the other hand, this work also enabled him to 
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realize his identity of being a scientist—to conduct the pure research in which he was 
interested.  
        Tang Peisong had developed a strong interest in exploring the fundamental nature of 
physical and chemical principles of living things since his years at the University of 
Minnesota. During his studies at the Johns Hopkins University, Woods Hole, and 
Harvard University, he decided to choose the physiology of plant respiration and 
photosynthesis as the focus of his scientific career—and he did insist on this focus all 
through his life, even during wartime. Research condition was extremely poor at 
Kunming during the war. Tang’s Laboratory of General Physiology was considered as 
the best-equipped laboratory in Southwest China because Lou Chenghou, an associate 
professor at this group, had brought back some specialized electrophysiology equipment 
from the US. However, Lou’s research was separated from the works of other scientists. 
For Tang and most of his colleagues and students, even the incubator and the 
refrigerators would break down very frequently. However, these scientists were still able 
to overcome these difficulties and generate top-ranking scientific knowledge. For 
instance, in March 1940, Tang Peisong and Luo Shiwei (罗士苇) published their research 
on polyploidy induced by colchicine treatment in Science (No. 2357).100 In December 
1943, Luo Shiwei and Wang Fuxiong (王伏雄) published their works on conifer 
physiology in Science (No. 2555).101 In 1945, because of Joseph Needham’s introduction, 
three young scientists at Tang’s group, Zheng Bolin (郑柏林), Chen Shaoling (陈绍龄), 
and Zheng Weiguang (郑伟光), published their research of puchiin in Nature (Vol. 
156),102 which was the first time anyone had purified an antibiotic from higher plants.103 
Among all the achievements of this group, I believe that the most interesting and 
                                                 
100 P.S. Tang, and W.S. Loo, “Polyploidy in Soybean, Pea, Wheat and Rice, Induced by 
Colchicine Treatment”, Science, Vol. 91, No. 2357, 1 March 1940, p. 222. 
101 S.W. Loo, and F.H. Wang, “The Culture of Young Conifer Embryos in vitro”, Science, Vol. 
98, No. 2555. 17 December 1943, p. 544. 
102 S.L. Chen, B.L. Cheng, W.K. Cheng, and P.S. Tang, “An Antibiotic Substance in the Chinese 
Water-chestnut, Eleocharis tuberosa”, Nature, Vol. 156, 25 August 1945, p. 234. 
103 The Brief History of the Institute of Botany at CAS, p. 622. 
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remarkable one should be Tang Peisong’s 1941 article on the “water relations” (now 
called “water potential” in plant physiology) during plant metabolism.  
        In 1940, Tang Peisong collaborated with Wang Zhuxi (王竹溪), a physics professor 
at Lianda, working on water relations in plant cells. They submitted their discoveries to 
the Journal of Physical Chemistry in U.S. in August 1940, in a study entitled “A 
Thermodynamic Formulation of the Water Relation in an Isolated Living Cell.” This 
article was published in the 3rd issue of Journal of Physical Chemistry in 1941. It 
proposed the thermodynamic methods to explain and calculate the water movement of 
plant cells with the concept of intra- and extra-cellular chemical potentials (although they 
did not use the term “potential” directly). Tang Peisong and Wang Zhuxi’s results were 
an important breakthrough in understanding the physical chemistry of water metabolism 
in plants at that time. This article demonstrated that scientists in wartime China were still 
active and enthusiastic in fundamental research and in participating actively in 
international scientific communication. However, their discoveries were too ahead of 
their time and were ignored for decades.104 In the 1960s, western scientists such as R. O. 
Slatyer, S. A. Taylor, and P. J. Kramer developed a systematic way to describe water 
metabolism in plant cells using the concept of “water potential”. They were considered as 
pioneers in unifying studies in this field, while Tang and Wang’s 1941 article had 
actually covered all essential points in the works of Slatyer, Taylor, and Kramer. In 1984, 
Kramer expressed a deep regret for neglecting Tang and Wang’s results.105 
        After 1949, Tang Peisong continued his research in the physiology of plant 
respiration and photosynthesis. For example, when taking the position of vice director of 
the Institute of Botany at CAS, Tang led his group in elucidating multiple pathways of  
                                                 
104 According to Google scholar (searched on August 3, 2012), Tang Peisong and Wang Zhuxi’s 
1941 article has only been cited by 14, while P. J. Kramer’s 1984 book Water Relations of Plants 
and Soils has been cited by 2514. 
105 Liu Jixing, “Collaboration between Tang Peisong and Wang Zhuxi on Water Relation in Plant 
Cells”, in Tsinghua University and Science and Technology in Modern China, edited by Yang 
Jian and Dai Wusan, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2006, pp. 97-118.  Originally published 
in Physics, 2003, No. 6 & No. 7. (刘寄星，“汤佩松和王竹溪关于植物细胞水分关系的合作研
究及其启示”，《清华大学与中国近现代科学技术》，杨舰，戴吾三编著，北京：清华大
学出版社，2006，页 211-222。原载《物理》2003年第 6、7期) 
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Figure 9. The global circulation of knowledge established by Tsinghua scientists in the 1940s 
continued to thrive after that period. The Chinese photosynthesis scientists delegation visited 
the laboratory of Melvin Calvin (discover of the Calvin cycle and winner of the 1961 Nobel 
Prize in chemistry) at Berkeley, California, in 1974. Four of these Chinese scientists were 
students and assistants of Tang Peisong and Yin Hongzhang—Shen Yungang (沈允钢),Kuang 
Tingyun (匡廷云), Li Liangbi (李良壁), and Zhang Qide (张其德) . (Gu Dinghai, “Exclusive 
Interviews with Shen Yungang”, 
http://shszx.eastday.com/node2/node22/lhsb/node4487/node4495/u1a23239.html) 
 
 
respiration in rice. He collaborated with scholars from Peking University, Nankai 
University, and the Beijing Agricultural University to apply these achievements to 
scientific research, higher education, and agricultural production. During the Cultural 
Revolution, Tang’s research was extensively interrupted by political movements, but he 
still paid close attention to trends in international academic circles. When hearing that the 
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U.S. Plant Studies Delegation visited China during August and September 1974,106 Tang 
proposed to leaders at CAS that China might also send a scientist delegation to the U.S. 
He suggested that photosynthesis was a hot topic at that time, and Chinese scientists had 
strong background in this field, so this delegation might be composed scientists focusing 
on plant metabolism and photosynthesis. The CAS leaders accepted Tang’s proposal and 
organized a “Plant Photosynthesis Delegation”. This delegation consisted of eight plant 
scientists and visited the US from November 15 to December 15, 1974. (See Figure 9.) 
Tang Peisong was excluded from this group because of his suspicious political 
background. But he was still very proud that this delegation of Chinese scientists was 
traveling to meet their western counterparts and to describe their research. The crucial 
impact of such an international delegation during the Cold War was not lost by Tang. In 
his memoirs, he bantered that this delegation functioned as “photosynthesis 
diplomacy”.107 
 
Fungi	Classification	
        When newly settled down at the program of plant pathology at Jinda, Dai Fanglan 
focused his research on fungi related to crop and fruit diseases rather than the basic 
research of fungi classification and systematics. However, when continuing writing 
scientific popularization articles for the Kexue journal, he noticed that from the 1870s to 
the early twentieth century, all publications on fungi in China were published by 
foreigners.108 China only provided raw materials for the research of natural history, but 
could not really contribute to the generation of scientific knowledge. Dai Fanglan’s pride 
                                                 
106 This delegation visited China from August 27 to September 23, 1974. Its members included 
world-renowned scientists, such as Richard L. Bernard, Norman E. Borlaug, Nyle C. Brady, 
Glenn W. Burton, John L. Creech, Jack R. Harlan, Arthur Kelman, Henry M. Munger, George F. 
Sprague, and Sterling Wortman. They visited many botany and agriculture institutes in China. 
Tang was suffering political persecution and not able to meet these American scientists, but some 
of his old colleagues (such as Yin Hongzhang) got chance to meet and talk with the delegation. 
See Sun Qiliang, “中国与美国古植物学交流与合作的大门是如何被打开的？”, 
http://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?mod=space&uid=225931&do=blog&id=378602 
107 Tang Peisong, p. 52. 
108 Dai Fanglan, “Collections of Fungi in China by Foreign Explorers”, Nanking Journal, 1(2), 
1932, pp. 537-548.  
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and the feeling of dual-identity of being both Chinese and a scientist made it hard for him 
to accept China’s disadvantage in scientific research.  
        One of Dai’s conflicts with Albert N. Steward, director of the program of plant 
pathology at Jinda finally motivated him to work on fungi classification. Steward 
promised to assist Professor Roland Thaxter (an American from Harvard University) to 
collect fungi specimens in Southwest China. Dai Fanglan insisted that Jinda should keep 
one copy of the fungus specimen and send another copy to Harvard. Steward was 
uncertain whether Chinese people were competent to carry out serious research on these 
fungi specimens, but he finally gave in to Dai Fanglan’s persistence. The problem was 
that there had never been Chinese scientists working on fungi taxonomy before. Dai 
Fanglan’s focus had been plant pathology research and anti-disease crop selecting. 
However, to break westerners’ monopoly on mycological research in China, he 
undertook the task of working on fungi specimens collected from Southwest China.109  
        Dai Fanglan’s 1930 article, “A new species of Uncinula on Acer Trifidum Hook and 
Arn”,110 marked the establishment of Chinese mycology. After that, Dai Fanglan shifted 
his research emphasis from practical pathology partly to identifying and classifying fungi 
in China, which became the research focus all through his life and has made him the 
founder of mycology in China. He also organized and instructed Chinese scientists and 
students in his program such as Zhou Jiachi, Yu Dafu, Chen Hongkui, Qiu Weifan,111 
Wei Jingchao, and Huang Liang to conduct research and surveys on fungi in East China. 
Dai Fanglan encouraged these younger researchers, stating that Chinese people should 
investigate and control national resources of their own and publish their findings as soon 
as possible to claim the achievements of Chinese scientists to the world.112  
                                                 
109 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 29-30. This was important work. Even today, only about 8% of fungal 
species have been named, classified, and related to other fungi (the majority coming from Europe, 
China and the USA). Bryn Dentinger, personal communication, 29 April 2013. 
110 This article was published in English in Volume 6, Issue 1 of Contributions from the 
Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China: Botanical series, Nanjing: the Science 
Society of China, 1930. 
111 These four scientists later joined the Tsinghua IOA and worked closely with Dai Fanglan in 
their later careers. 
112 Cheng Guangsheng, p. 31. 
  70 
        From then on, Dai Fanglan moved part of his research emphasis to fundamental 
research of mycology and published plenty of research articles at the international level. 
His series of articles, “Notes on Chinese Fungi”, was started during the years at Jinda, 
and lasted through his years at Peiping and Yunnan. Although the war caused a lot of 
troubles for Dai’s research, the forced migration from north China to Hunan in middle 
China, then to Yunnan in Southwest China, also enabled him to survey and study fungi at 
different sites of China. Yunnan province has very diverse and complex geological 
landscapes and biological species. Western researchers such as J.W. Delavary and 
Narcisse Theophile Patouillard had discovered and described hundreds of fungi from 
Yunnan. Knowing these facts, Dai Fanglan would definitely grasp the opportunity to 
research on fungi in this region. During the eight years in Yunnan, the primary tasks for 
Dai and his research group was to work on disease related to economic plants in 
southwest China and to teach students at Lianda. However, Dai Fanglan took every 
chance to conduct surveys of fungi in Yunnan. He and the young scientists in the division 
of plant pathology had explored and collected more than two hundred species of fungi, 
and named over sixty of them. Some of these discoveries were published in the No. IX of 
Dai’s “Notes on Chinese Fungi” in 1939; some were published in western journals such 
as Lloydia and Farlowia between 1944 and 1948.113 
        If Tang Peisong exemplified how a second-generation Chinese scientist succeeded 
in balancing pure and practical research and was therefore able to contribute to both 
China and science, for Dai Fanglan, there was no need to balance—he combined the 
desire to serve his country and scientific knowledge. As a first-generation American-
trained Chinese scientist, Dai believed that contributing to science meant much more than 
pure scientific research. It also involved institution building such as establishing journals, 
academic societies, and training younger researchers. From 1930 to 1948, Dai Fanglan 
played active roles in all these activities. For example, in May 1929, he collaborated with 
his Cornell alumni friends, such as Zou Bingwen and Deng Shuqun, to establish the 
Chinese Society for Plant Pathology. Also in this year, they applied a grant from the 
                                                 
113 For example, see Tai F.L., “Studies in the Geoglossaceae of Yunnan”, Lloydia, 7(2), 1944, pp. 
146-162; and “Cercosporae of China II”, Lloydia, 11(1), 1948, pp. 36-56. 
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China foundation to support Herbert H. Whetzel, their professor and advisor from Cornell 
University, to come to China and give lectures. In August 1933, he participated in 
establishing the Chinese Society of Botany. In 1934, he took the position of editor for the 
Chinese Journal of Botany.114 Dai Fanglan believed that these scientific journals, 
societies and lectures could help Chinese scientists communicate with international 
scientific communities equally.115 
         Dai Fanglan’s early experience suggested different strategies from those of Liu 
Chongle and Tang Peisong. Liu Chongle was claiming the academic duty and autonomy 
of university scientists and tried to get rid of interference from non-scientific issues, 
although his “pure” scientific research actually involved plenty of practical benefits for 
China. Tang Peisong was enthusiastic in many events such as applying practical scientific 
knowledge, conducting pure scientific research, communicating with foreign scientists, 
training young students and establishing scientific institution. Tang was able to arrange 
all these issues on different tracks and made excellent balance among them. Dai Fanglan 
did not consider the desire to conduct pure scientific research as an issue separated from 
his “love for China” at all. In Dai’s career, pure scientific research, as well as practical 
research and institutional establishment, were closely connected to each other because 
they were all ways to create good science and to serve China—for Dai Fanglan, “being a 
scientist” meant a good way to “being a Chinese person”. Each of the three leading 
scientists at Tsinghua IOA is an example of the different ways of managing the 
interaction between “being Chinese” and “being a scientist”, between local and global, 
and between pure and applied research.  
  
                                                 
114 The chief editor of this journal was Hu Xiansu (胡先骕, 1894-1968), a Harvard University 
botany Ph.D. and the first Chinese scientist working on taxonomy of plants in China. This journal 
stopped publication in 1937 because of the war.  
115 Cheng Guangsheng, pp. 29-31. 
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Figure 10. In 1948, the Academia Sinica—the National Central Academy—selected its 
academicians for the first time. About ten of the first eighty‐one academicians had 
conducted agriculture‐related research, and the former Tsinghua IOA scientists 
counted four of them. This photo shows Yu Dafu, Tang Peisong, and Dai Fanglan. (Yin 
Hongzhang was travelling abroad at that time).  
        The ten agricultural scientists were Qian Chongshu (钱崇澍), Hu Xiansu (胡先骕), 
Li Xianwen (李先闻), Chen Zhen (陈桢), Luo Zongluo (罗宗洛), Deng Shuqun (邓叔群), 
Dai Fanglan, Tang Peisong, Yu Dafu, and Yin Hongzhang. Except for Qian, Hu, and Luo, 
all the rest of these scientists had been supported by the Tsinghua scholarships or 
worked at Tsinghua IOA. 
VI.	Conclusions	
        Although the Tsinghua IOA scientists conducted their works in a turbulent era that 
seemed very unsuitable for the development of scientific knowledge, they were able to 
adapt to the chaotic environment of Republican China because of their motivation of the 
dual-identity of being both Chinese and scientists. Their dual-identity developed in the 
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distinctive historical context of semi-colonial and decentralized China. The republican 
era of China (1910s-1949) was characterized by cultural, social, and political tensions 
such as the tensions between the Chinese and the foreign, between the central 
government and local situations, and between local and global circumstances. By 
stressing the dual-identity through their lives and careers, the Tsinghua IOA scientists 
were able to take proper strategies to relieve these tensions. They not only survived and 
adapted to the chaotic environment, but also had made remarkable contributions to both 
their country and the sciences they worked on. Moreover, they developed more advanced 
scientific knowledge in the local environments and fed the achievements back to their 
foreign colleagues, and therefore contributed to the global circulation of scientific 
knowledge.  
        The history of Tsinghua IOA is an important case study illustrating how the dual-
identity of being both Chinese and scientist had enabled Chinese scientists to pursue 
education in foreign countries, and how these scientists had managed to deal with diverse 
local conditions and develop in chaotic environment after returning China. The lives and 
careers of Dai Fanglan and Tang Peisong, two leading Tsinghua IOA scientists in this 
project, exemplified the dual-identity’s influence on the first and the second generations 
of American-trained Chinese scientists in Republican China. Both of them possessed 
strong desire to serve their country and people as well as to contribute to the development 
of science. However, they were facing different circumstances. The identity of being 
Chinese and scientist played significant roles in the lives and careers of both the older 
and younger scientists, but in different ways.  
        The first-generation scientists such as Dai Fanglan usually kept contradictory 
feelings towards foreign countries. They were active in pursuing useful knowledge and 
resources from foreign countries in order to serve China. Meanwhile, compared with the 
younger generation, they were more sensitive to foreigner’s superiority and felt 
humiliated more deeply and frequently, because for the first-generation Chinese 
scientists, scientific institution in China was extremely underdeveloped, which made it 
almost impossible for Chinese scientists to have equal academic communication with 
their western colleagues. Therefore, for the first-generation scientists, serving China and 
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contributing to science meant similar activities—creating a scientific institution to enable 
Chinese scientists conducting high-level scientific research and education. These 
scientists were highly devoted to establishing scientific schools, societies, publications, or 
building up the foundation of research in certain disciplines, as Dai Fanglan did. Because 
of these early efforts, the second generation returned to better developed professional 
institutions during the 1930s and 1940s. They were able to be more concentrated on 
research and education. In addition to the desire to serve China and Chinese people, these 
younger scientists were enthusiastic to contribute to international science as well, and 
their research had covered more diverse topics, both pure and practical. 
        Tsinghua IOA’s establishment and development illustrated the tensions between 
foreign and Chinese and between central and local. Despite difficulties caused by 
political changes, these scientists motivated by the dual-identity were able to adopt 
flexible and proper strategies to adapt to different local conditions and to keep 
communicating with their international scientific colleagues. They succeeded in keeping 
their research programs running, training young students, and resolving practical 
agricultural problems. Although political and social situations required scientists to focus 
on most useful and practical researches to save China, these scientists kept long-term 
perspective and balanced pure research and applications in their works, because they 
believed that pure research with less direct beneficial outcomes would contribute to 
international scientific research as well as promote China’s status in the global scientific 
community. It was the dual-identity of being both Chinese and scientists that motivated 
the Tsinghua IOA scientists to take these strategies. The idea “dual-identity” might be 
applied to the history of other agriculture institutes and schools in Republican China. 
Moreover, scientists and their sciences can never thrive without connecting and adapting 
to their historical and local contexts. Therefore, the motivations and strategies of these 
Tsinghua IOA scientists can help us to understand how scientists acquired, developed, 
and circulated knowledge in the history of science. 
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Archives	and	Online	Databases	
Archives at the Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences 
China Agricultural University Archives 
The First Historical Archives of China 
Library at the Institute of Botany at the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
National Science Libraries at the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Peking University Archives 
Reference Library at the Institute of Microbiology at the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
The Second Historical Archives of China 
Tsinghua University Archives 
University of Minnesota Archives 
 
Academia Historica (國史館, http://www.drnh.gov.tw/Default_Chinese.aspx)  
Academia Sinica Digital Resources (中央研究院數位典藏資源網, 
http://digiarch.sinica.edu.tw/en_index.html) 
Atlases at the United States Military Academy, 
http://www.usma.edu/history/SitePages/Our%20Atlases.aspx 
China Agricultural University Archives Online Museum, (中国农业大学档案馆百年校
史展览, http://www.cau.edu.cn/dag/hmuseum/index.php 
Needham Research Institute, Wartime China Photographs Archives, 
http://www.nri.org.uk/JN_wartime_photos/home.htm 
Sun Yat-Sen University Online History, http://gjs.sysu.edu.cn/zsdxxs/index.html 
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